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Abstract
A providers performance report consists of his service average outcome and volume. The two variables
depend on the providers private quality type and current demand, but he can raise his average outcome
by dumping vulnerable consumers. Prospective consumers infer providers qualities from their reports.
Performance reporting drives some providers to dump consumers when competition is intense, but it may
not reveal providersqualities when their average quality is high. Statistical adjustment aiming at making
reports independent of consumer characteristics can lead to more dumping, less informative reports, or both.
There is more dumping when volume information is withheld and less dumping when ratings information is
coarse.
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1 Introduction
Success should be judged by results, and data is a powerful tool to determine results. We
cant ignore facts. We cant ignore data.
President Barack Obama, July 24, 2009
Public reporting is instituted to collect and disseminate performance data so that success can be judged.
New York State started reporting cardiac surgery performance in 1989. Since then, public performance re-
porting has penetrated the health care sector and other sectors such as social services, crime and enforcement,
and education, in the United States and elsewhere.
Unlike private agencies that can report opaque or subjective performance measures, public agencies are
often obligated to base their reports on transparent and objective measures.1 Therefore, most public per-
formance reports use end results as measures of underlying service qualities. Because results often depend
on clientele, some public performance reports are adjusted to isolate service qualities from consumer char-
acteristics. Table 1 gives some examples of public performance reports under four categories based on their
contents.2
Contents of reports Examples
1. Average outcome and volume Child protection investigation completion
rate and number of cases of a district
2. Adjusted average outcome and volume Surgery mortality rate of a hospital adjusted
for patient severities and number of cases
3. Average outcome Standardized test passing rate of a school
4. Adjusted average outcome Job placement rate of a training center
adjusted for enrollment demographics
Table 1: Four categories of public performance reports
Although these reports have di¤erent contents, they share a common purpose of using results to direct
consumer choice and resource allocation. For example, surgery outcome reports induce patients to switch
1For example, Google search uses secret algorithms to rank the relevance of web pages. Ederer et al. (2014) show
that opaque incentive schemes can outperform transparent ones when agents are strategic. A large literature studies
subjective performance evaluation; see, for example, Levin (2003) and MacLeod (2003).
2These examples are from Florida Department of Children and Families (http://dcfdashboard.dcf.state..us);
New York Department of Health (http://health.ny.gov/statistics); Indiana Department of Educa-
tion (http://compass.doe.in.gov); and United States Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) program
(http://wdr.doleta.gov/opr/fulltext/99-performance.pdf). The JTPA program was replaced by the Workforce
Investment Act program in 2000.
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from high-mortality to low-mortality hospitals; job placement reports allow funding authorities to determine
training centersbudgets according to their placement rates. These changes benet patients and trainees if
the end results are perfect measures of service qualities.
However, a provider is likely to have more information about his consumers than the public reporting
agency. This allows a provider to manipulate his end results strategically. For example, a low quality school
can raise its standardized test passing rate by retaining weaker students and increasing special education
placements (Jacob, 2005). These strategic behaviors can harm the a¤ected students, and defeat the purpose
of performance reporting by making the passing rates uninformative.
In this article, I develop a model to study how public performance reporting a¤ects providersservice
decisions and consumer welfare. Providers in the model have private information about their service qualities
and demands. They can manipulate their reports by dumping consumers with certain characteristics.3 , 4
The model shows how the four categories of reports in Table 1 yield di¤erent dumping choices, report
informativeness, and consumer welfare. In particular, I show that reporting adjusted outcomes (categories
2 and 4 in Table 1) may lead to more dumping, less informative reports, and lower consumer welfare.
These results can account for a number of empirical ndings. They are also useful for the design of public
performance reporting strategy.
For concreteness, consider a market for surgery as an application. In each of two periods, some new
patients would like to receive treatments from one of two providers. Each patients severity can be high or
low and each providers quality type can be good or bad. A patients treatment outcome depends on her
severity and the quality type of her provider. The number of patients who request a providers service is
stochastic, but increasing in the providers perceived quality. Each provider receives positive payo¤s from
providing services.
A providers quality type is his private information. If there is no performance reporting, the demands
3 In this article, I follow Ellis (1997) and use the term dumping to refer the avoidance of consumers with worse
service outcomes. However, many authors use the terms dumping and cream-skimming interchangeably.
4 In addition to dumping weaker students, Dranove et al. (2003) nd that cardiac surgery performance reports
have led surgeons to dump sicker patients; Heckman and Smith (2004) nd that applicants with less education and
from poorer families are less likely to be enrolled for job training programs.
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in both periods are independent of the providersquality types. Now suppose a public reporting agency
observes and reports the quality type of each provider at the end of period one. These reports induce some
patients in period two to switch from a bad provider to a good provider.5 Because the providersreports are
independent of their treatment choices, they have no incentives to dump patients in either period.
Next, suppose the reporting agency can only observe and report each providers average treatment out-
come and volume (report category 1 in Table 1) at the end of period one. Now a providers report depends
on his quality type as well as the number of patients who request his services in period one, and whom
among those patients he chooses to treat. If a good provider receives many treatment requests in period
one, the provider can obtain a report with high average treatment outcome and high volume by serving all
his patients. This report will convince the patients in period two that the provider is a good type, as if the
agency observed and reported the providers type.
However, a good provider who receives fewer treatment requests cannot reveal his type by treating all
his patients in period one. This is because his report can be mimicked by a bad provider who receives many
requests in period one and dumps some of his patients. Dumping is costly to both provider types in question.
However, patient reactions to performance reports in period two create incentive trade-o¤s between treating
more patients in period one, and getting more patients in period two. These trade-o¤s shape the equilibrium
outcomes.
In partial pooling equilibria, both a good provider with fewer requests and a bad provider with many
requests have the same reported average outcome and volume. Partial pooling equilibria are more likely to
exist when patients are responsive to quality di¤erence and the providersexpected quality is high, so that a
perceived bad type loses a signicant amount of patients in period two. Comparing this with the benchmark
case where the agency observes quality types, there are two sources of ine¢ ciency. First, at least one provider
type who obtains the partial pooling report dumps patients in period one.6 Second, the equilibrium reports
5Although the model focuses on consumer response, it can be easily modied to accommodate explicit rewards
and sanctions for performance.
6 It is not possible for a bad provider with fewer treatment requests in period one to mimic any good provider under
report category 1. Hence, this provider must accept all patients in period one and reveal his type in any equilibrium.
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are less informative to the patients in period two. These ine¢ ciencies can make performance reporting
welfare-deteriorating. Furthermore, the partial pooling equilibrium with the least dumping cost is selected
by the undefeated equilibrium renement (Mailath et al., 1993) as the games unique equilibrium when the
providersexpected quality is su¢ ciently high.
However, the separating equilibria with the least dumping costs are the only undefeated equilibria when
patients are not responsive to quality di¤erence, or when patients are responsive but the providersexpected
quality is low. Separating performance reports fully reveal each providers quality type, and hence there is
no ine¢ ciency in period two. Yet, a good provider with fewer requests can treat all his patients in period
one only if patients are not responsive to quality di¤erence. Otherwise, the good provider has to dump some
of his sicker patients to raise his average outcome and credibly separate from a bad type with many requests.
This ine¢ ciency alone can make the separating reports welfare-deteriorating too.
Now let the agency switch to reporting adjusted outcomes and volumes (report category 2). Furthermore,
suppose the reporting agency cannot observe a patients severity but it can observe the patients age, and age
is an informative signal in the sense that older patients are more likely to be sicker. The agency can adjust
the average treatment outcomes by comparing the patientsactual treatment outcomes with the expected
treatment outcomes based on the patientsages.7 Because severity and age are correlated, a sicker patients
poor treatment outcome is compensated by a poor expected treatment outcome. Dumping sicker patients
would become a less e¤ective way to manipulate performance reports.
I show that this logic fails when severity and age are not highly correlated. This is because statistical
adjustment alters the information asymmetry problem in a subtle way. Although the reporting agency
can infer a patients expected severity from her age, a provider knows his patients severity better. When
severity and age are not highly correlated, a small but signicant proportion of sicker patients are young.
The agency expects them to have good treatment outcomes. By dumping these patients, a bad provider
with many treatment requests can raise his adjusted average more than his unadjusted average. It becomes
easier for a bad provider to mimic or pool with a good provider with fewer requests.
7This kind of statistical adjustment is termed risk adjustment in the health care sector and value-added modelling
in the education sector.
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When the agency ceases to report volumes, report categories 1 and 2 in Table 1 become categories 3
and 4, respectively.8 It is perhaps not surprising that reports without volume information are more prone
to gaming. However, I nd that adjusting the average outcomes can still lead to more dumping when
volumes are not reported. Finally, I show that in my environment a coarse reporting scheme can eliminate
all dumping and reveal some quality information. This reporting scheme can improve consumer welfare over
report categories 1 and 2 when the e¢ ciency loss from dumping is severe.
Evidence and literature
My model o¤ers a systematic way to interpret empirical evidence on dumping, information content of per-
formance reports, and consumer welfare. Take the cardiac surgery outcome reporting initiative for example.
Zhang (2011) shows that the introduction of surgeon performance reports in New York have led to gaming in
Manhattan, where competition is erce, but not elsewhere. This observation is consistent with the prediction
of my model.
My model also predicts that separating performance reports can make consumers worse o¤ because of
dumping by good providers. In New York, informative reports have improved matching between hospitals
and providers, but worsened patient outcomes (Dranove et al., 2003). Moreover, Jha and Epstein (2006) nd
that surgeons with good reports left New York practices because of the pressure to reject high-risk patients
and focus on documentation.
On the other hand, in Massachusetts, the rst three annual cardiac surgery outcome reports show no
signicant performance di¤erence between hospitals in the state (Mass-DAC, 2005-07). Yet, the proportion
of high-risk patients undergoing heart surgeries in Massachusetts has declined by 47% in the same period
(Resnic and Welt, 2009). My model suggests that such equilibrium outcome can exist when the providers
are likely to be good.
I show that adjusting outcomes with inaccurate information about consumer characteristics cannot reduce
gaming. This result is of practical relevance. Using data from a large U.S. federal job training program (see
8An alternative interpretation is that consumers fail to understand the informational content of a providers service
volume.
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the JTPA program in footnote 2), Courty et al. (2011) nd that training centers improve their adjusted
placement outcomes by selecting enrollees according to characteristics missed by the adjustment model.
Recently, many reporting agencies in the education sector use adjusted student test scores to evaluate
schools and teachers. These agencies use past test scores to control for student characteristics. However,
using data from North Carolina, Kane and Staiger (2002) nd that only 60% of the variations in test-score
gains were persistent over time.
In the health care sector, Brown et al. (2014) nd that adjusting Medicare payments by enrollee risk
factors has led to insurersgaming and higher government expenditure. Similar statistical models are used
to adjust provider performance reports. However, providers are likely to have more information about their
patients than insurers do. For example, 44.7% of patients in Massachusetts who died after cardiac surgery
at Brigham and Womens Hospital had at least one severe medical condition not considered by the reporting
agencys risk adjustment model (Resnic and Welt, 2009).9
The literature on quality disclosure is large. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) show that demand
response is su¢ cient to drive providers to reveal their private quality information voluntarily. Many sub-
sequent articles examine the underlying assumptions of this unraveling result, and recommend mandatory
quality reporting when those assumptions are not met.10 However, these articles are based on a common
assumption that quality information is private but perfectly veriable.11
Quality information is not perfectly veriable in my model as well as in Holmstrom (1999). In Holmstroms
career concern model, a single providers observable performance depends on his ability type, his private
action, and a random shock. The providers type is commonly unknown, and he exerts type-independent
e¤ort to inuence market perception about his ability type. I introduce provider competition in a way similar
9 I will further discuss empirical evidence that is consistent with other testable predictions of the model in Section
7.
10Section 2.1 of Dranove and Jin (2010) o¤ers a comprehensive review of theoretical research on voluntary and
mandatory quality disclosure.
11 In Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) and Bar-Issac et al. (2012), mandatory disclosure can be welfare-
deteriorating because a provider may refrain from acquiring quality information or underprovide unreported qualities.
On the other hand, Lizzeri (1999), Albano and Lizzeri (2001) focus on prot-maximizing reporting agenciesincentives
to manipulate quality reports.
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to Daughety and Reinganum (2007) to make demands in period one independent of the providersdumping
decisions. This allows a providers quality type and demand shock to be his private information, and his
dumping decisions to be type and demand dependent.
Under report categories 1 and 2 in Table 1, consumers in period two infer a providers private quality
type from both his unadjusted/adjusted average outcome and volume. This is essentially a multidimensional
signalling problem. The literature on multidimensional signalling is small. Chen (1997) studies a game
where a rm has private information about cost and demand (both binary). The rm can use diversication
and nancing activities (again both binary) to signal its private information. Chen characterizes separating
equilibria and two kinds of partial pooling equilibria. Bagwell (2007) considers an entry deterrence game in
which the incumbent has private information about his cost and patience types (both binary). The incumbent
can use any nonnegative price and advertising level to signal its types, but the entrant is interested in the
incumbents cost type only. Bagwell shows that three kinds of partial pooling equilibria can survive the
intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).
In line with Chen (1997) and Bagwell (2007), I assume a provider has private information about his quality
type and period-one demand, and they are both binary. However, the report content (unadjusted/adjusted
average outcome and volume) through which a provider signals his quality type to period-two consumers
is controlled by the reporting agency. This allows me to compare providersstrategic responses under the
four categories of reports in the multidimensional signalling framework. I show how the report content
determines the existence of a unique kind of rened partial pooling equilibria, and the welfare properties of
rened separating equilibria.12
Chen (2011) also considers performance reporting as a multidimensional signalling problem. He focuses
on report category 1. However, providersdemands are deterministic and their quality types are perfectly
correlated in his model. Therefore, it is impossible for a bad provider to mimic a good provider when each
provider faces an identical distribution of patients. He then allows an informed physician to refer more
12Fong (2009) derives optimal screening contracts that separate a good provider from a bad provider. In Ely and
Valimaki (2003) the strategic behavior of a good provider causes consumers to refuse to hire, hence the market breaks
down.
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patients who are sicker to the good provider. The uneven distributions of patients lead the good provider to
dump patients.
Glazer and McGuire (2000) is the rst article to study statistical adjustment in an equilibrium model.
They show that using informative signals to adjust insurance premiums statistically can mitigate adverse
selection in the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) screening framework. They further show that adverse selection
can be completely eliminated by overpaying the bad signal and underpaying the good signal. So far this
literature has exclusively focused on screening models. In this article I consider signalling and show that
adjusting performance reports statistically can intensify rather than mitigate patient selection.13 , 14
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a baseline model where a providers
performance report is about service volume and average outcome. Section 3 introduces two informational
benchmarks, and considers the feasibility and cost of report manipulation. Section 4 characterizes two classes
of equilibria, which are further analyzed and compared to the benchmarks in Section 5. Section 6 considers
the e¤ects of statistically adjusting performance reports. Section 7 discusses some of the models testable
predictions and extensions, and then concludes the article. The Appendix contains all proofs omitted in the
main text. Finally, the Supplement extends the model by allowing prices to vary with providersperceived
service qualities, and considers the renement of the equilibria in Section 4 by the intuitive criterion.
2 Model
Providers, consumers, and services
Consider two service providers, Provider x and Provider y. Each provider i = x; y belongs to one of two
quality types: bad or good. Provider is quality type is captured by a variable Ti 2 fB;Gg, where B < G
and B is normalized to zero. There are many consumers. Each consumers characteristic is captured by a
13Ma and Mak (2014) consider a monopolist who uses a menu of multi-quality goods to screen consumers. The
monopolists quality choices are observed by a reporting agency only. The article shows that the agency can mitigate
the monopolists quality distortion by reporting just the average quality of each good.
14Ma and Mak (2015) show that by bundling quality and cost information optimally, a regulator can induce a
provider to invest in cost e¢ ciency even if its cost is fully reimbursed. I will briey consider the benet and cost of
coarsening performance reports in Section 7.
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binary variable s 2 fl; hg (low and high), where 0 < l < h. I will sometimes use the terms a Ti typeand
an s consumer.
Each consumer demands one unit of service. Each performed service generates an outcome. If a Ti type
serves an s consumer, the outcome is Ti+ s. This simple formulation captures how the provider quality type
and consumer characteristic a¤ect service outcomes. First, for a given consumer characteristic s, service
outcome is better if the consumer is served by a good type, and the parameter G can be interpreted as a
service quality premium. Second, for a given provider quality type Ti, an h consumer has a better service
outcome than an l consumer.
A consumers payo¤ from service also depends on her own characteristic and her providers quality type.
An s consumer receives UsT = Ti + v
s  P from a Ti types service. Because B < G, a consumer benets
more from a G types service. The variable vs captures how a consumers characteristic a¤ects her payo¤
from service. I let 0 < vh  vl, that is, an l consumer receives a weakly higher payo¤ than an h consumer
if both are served by the same type of provider. The positive parameter P is the service price and P < vh,
hence UsT is always strictly positive.
15
The distinction between outcome and payo¤ may rst appear to be unnatural. I now use some examples
in Table 1 to illustrate the di¤erence. In the surgery report example, a consumers characteristic is about
her health status. A surgery outcome is a measure such as 30-day mortality rate or readmission rate.
A sicker patient is more likely to die or be readmitted after surgery, but may benet more from surgery
over alternative treatments. In the job training example, a consumers characteristic is about her initial
employment readiness. A training outcome is some short-term measures such as hourly wage and employment
rate upon completion. A trainees payo¤ is about her long-term earnings and employment gain. Heckman et
al. (2002) nd that these short- and long-term measures are either uncorrelated or negatively correlated.16
This article is about how public performance reports distort service-provision decisions in both public
and private sectors. In the model, I allow providers to receive both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards from
15 I use G to denote quality premium in terms of both outcome and payo¤ for ease in notation. This can be
considered as normalizing one of the two dimensions.
16 I will further consider the implication of vl < vh in Section 5.
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service provisions. When a Ti type serves an s consumer, the providers payo¤ is sT = !(Ti+v
s)+(1 !)P ,
where 0  !  1.17 Hence, sT is a weighted sum of the s consumers net payo¤ and the Ti types prot,
where the service cost is set to zero for simplicity.
Information, demand response, and dumping
The providers live two periods. A providers quality type is his private information. Each provider is a good
type with probability , and a bad type with probability 1  . The providers are ex ante identical. Their
types are drawn independently at the beginning of the game and xed over the two periods. A consumer
lives in either period one or two. A consumers characteristic is h with probability , and l with probability
1 . Each consumers characteristic is drawn independently, and the realization is only observed by herself
and the provider she visits.
A providers demand is the mass of atomless consumers who request his services in a period. The two
providersdemands are determined in each period by both the state of nature and consumersbeliefs about
the providersquality types. First, suppose the consumers perceive that the two providers are of the same
quality type. Provider is demand in this case is qi 2 f1; kg, where 1 < k. That is, the mass of consumers
in the low-demand state is normalized to one. The draws of qi are independent and qi = k with probability
. A providers expected demand in this case is bq  k + (1  ).
Now suppose the consumers perceive that the quality types of Providers x and y are respectively eTx and
eTy, where eTx < eTy. Here, I let ( eTy   eTx)qx be the mass of Provider xs consumers who switch to Provider
y. The positive parameter  is a measure of demand responsiveness to perceived quality di¤erences.18 The
expected demands of Providers x and y in this case are [1 ( eTy  eTx)]bq and [1+( eTy  eTx)]bq, respectively.19
I assume 0 <  <  and  < 1G , so that (
eTy   eTx) is strictly less than one. The case where eTy < eTx is
17See, for example, Francois (2000) on public service motivation and McGuire (2000) on physician altruism. The
intrinsic rewards are in the form of warm-glow payo¤s or impure altruism (Andreoni, 1989). I will also consider the
implication of assuming providers to be purely altruistic in Footnote 36.
18All the results in this article hold qualitatively if the demand responsiveness of l and h consumers are  l and h,
respectively, and  l 6= h.
19Note that these demand functions are identical to those derived from a Hotelling model with linear transportation
costs when qi are deterministic.
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analogous.
Consumers in both periods cannot directly observe the providersquality types or demands. However,
a non-strategic reporting agency disseminates performance reports of the two providers at the beginning of
period two. Provider is report, (Mi; Ai), is about the mass of consumers he has served in period one, Mi,
and the average service outcome of these consumers, Ai. These numbers depend on the providers demand,
quality type, and the characteristic of the consumers that the provider chooses to serve in period one (see
Section 3). In particular, a provider observes his consumerstypes and he can dump some of his consumers
based on consumer characteristic.
As discussed in the introduction, consumer dumping can take many forms and is di¢ cult to monitor in
practice. In the model, I assume that the reporting agency cannot observe the demand or mass of consumers
that a provider dumps in period one. Moreover, the reporting agency cannot observe the characteristic of
consumers whom a provider chooses to serve. I will allow the agency to have some information about the
consumerscharacteristic in Section 6.
Dumping is costly for both providers and consumers. When a provider dumps his consumer, the payo¤s of
both parties become zero. Hence, a Ti type and an s consumer lose, respectively, sT and U
s
T from dumping.
A providers objective is to maximize his aggregate payo¤ over the two periods. There is no discounting
between periods.
Extensive form and solution concept
The extensive form of the game is as follows.
Stage 1A: Nature decides the two providersquality types and privately informs each provider of his own
type. Nature together with consumersbeliefs determine the two providersperiod-one demands.
Stage 1B: Each provider observes his period-one demand. He chooses to serve or dump each of his con-
sumers after observing their characteristic. The services are performed and period one ends.
Stage 2A: The reporting agency announces the period-one performance reports. Nature together with
consumersbeliefs determine the two providersperiod-two demands.
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Stage 2B: Each provider observes his period-two demand. He chooses to serve or dump each of his con-
sumers after observing their characteristic. The services are performed and the game ends.
I characterize pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. Because the prior distributions over
the quality types Ti and exogenous demands qi are the same for Providers x and y, I will focus on symmetric
equilibria. An equilibrium is symmetric if the two providers use the same strategy and the consumers
inferences about a providers quality type depend only on his report but not his identity i.
3 Preliminary analysis
Benchmarks: Perfect Report and No Report
I rst introduce two benchmarks. Under Perfect Report, the providersquality types are perfectly veriable
as in the quality disclosure literature. The reporting agency observes and reports the quality types, (Tx; Ty),
of the two providers in Stage 2A.20 A providers report is independent of the realization of his demand and
service decisions in period one. Because sT is strictly positive, the two providers serve all their consumers in
both periods. However, the benchmark preserves information asymmetry in period one. In this period, the
uninformed consumers must perceive that the two providers o¤er services with the same expected quality.
Therefore, each providers expected demand is bq, irrespective of his quality type. The consumers in period
two can respond to the perfect reports. The expected demands of the two providers are:
Tx; Ty G;G G;B B;G B;B
Provider xs expected demand bq (1 + G)bq (1  G)bq bq
Provider ys expected demand bq (1  G)bq (1 + G)bq bq
Table 2: Expected demands in period two under Perfect Report
The second benchmark is No Report. If there are no performance reports, the providers cannot convey
credible information about their quality types in either period. Each providers expected demand is bq and
he serves all his consumers in both periods, irrespective of his quality type.
20This benchmark was rst introduced by Mailath (1989) to analyze the welfare properties of simultaneous sig-
nalling. The case where consumers in every period know the quality type of each provider cannot be achieved by
reports on past performances, and hence is a less relevant benchmark.
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Feasible performance reports
Now consider the extensive-form game in Section 2. In this game, the providersexpected demands in Stage
1A and their service decisions in Stage 2B are identical to those in the two benchmarks. In Stage 1A, quality
information is not available. Consumers must perceive the providers as identical. In Stage 2B, the last stage
of the game, the positive payo¤s sT drive the providers to serve all consumers.
However, the two providersservice decisions in Stage 1B and their expected demands in Stage 2A are
linked by performance reporting. In Stage 1B, Provider is service decisions inuence his report (Mi; Ai).
The report then inuences consumersbeliefs and hence the providers expected demand in Stage 2A. This
demand response, in turn, inuences the providers service decisions in Stage 1B.
I rst consider the linkage between a providers service decisions in Stage 1B and his report. Because a
providers choice is independent of his identity i in a symmetric equilibrium, I will remove the subscript i
when there is no confusion. Moreover, I will use the term a Tq providerto summarize a providers private
information in Stage 1B, that is, his quality type T and his period-one demand q. Now suppose a Tq provider
dumps DsTq of his s consumers in Stage 1B. His performance report is
(M;A) =
 
q  DhTq  DlTq;
fq DhTqg(T + h) + fq(1  ) DlTqg(T + l)
q  DhTq  DlTq
!
: (1)
Invert equation (1), a Tq provider must dump
(DhTq(M;A); D
l
Tq(M;A)) =

q 

A  T   l
h  l

M; q(1  ) 

T + h A
h  l

M

(2)
of his h and l consumers to obtain report (M;A), where M 2 [0; q] and A 2 [T + l; T + h] [ 0.
The left panel of Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship among a providers quality type, demand and
service decisions in period one, and his report. First consider point a where M = 1 and A = G + bs,
bs  h + (1   )l. This is the report a G1 provider obtains if he serves all his consumers in period one.
Starting from this point, the provider can raise his average outcome A by dumping some l consumers, or
lower his A by dumping some h consumers. However, dumping will lower the mass of served consumers M .
The area bounded by the solid curves represents the combinations of (M;A) that the provider can obtain
by dumping consumers. Points b, c, and d in the diagram respectively represent the reports that Gk, B1,
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Figure 1: Feasibility of gaming and iso-cost curves
and Bk providers obtain if they serve all consumers in period one.
Because of the demand responses in period two, a bad type wants to be perceived as a good type
irrespective of his demand in period one. However, because a Gk provider has both quality premium and
high demand, it is impossible for B1 and Bk providers to mimic his report, even if the Gk provider serves
all his consumers in period one. How about mimicking a G1 provider? The quality di¤erence prevents a B1
provider from mimicking a G1 provider who dumps no consumers. However, the following lemma provides
conditions such that a Bk provider can mimic a G1 provider who serves all his consumers.
Lemma 1 The performance report of a Gk provider who serves all his consumers cannot be mimicked.
However, assume that k   1 < k(1   ), the report of a G1 provider who serves all his consumers can be
mimicked by a Bk provider who dumps some of his consumers if
G  (k   1)(h  l): (3)
The inequality k 1 < k(1 ) says that a Bk providers demand from l consumers, k(1 ), is su¢ ciently
big, so that he can achieveM = 1 by dumping some but not all of his l consumers. The inequality in (3) says
that the quality premium G is su¢ ciently small, so that a Bk provider can achieve A  G+ bs by dumping
k   1 of his l consumers. The two inequalities imply that point a in the left panel of Figure 1 is to the
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southwest of the downward-sloping dashed curve.21 , 22
Iso-dumping-cost curves
Lemma 1 establishes the feasibility of gaming the performance reports. I now turn to the providersdumping
costs in Stage 1B. Because a Tq provider loses sT from dumping an s consumer, the providers dumping
cost is the same for any combinations of DhTq and D
l
Tq that satisfy D
h
Tq
h
T + D
l
Tq
l
T = F , where F is a
positive constant. Using the denitions of DhTq(M;A) and D
l
Tq(M;A) in (2), I can dene a Tq providers
iso-dumping-cost curve in terms of M and A. Totally di¤erentiating the equation with respect to M and A,
I obtain the slopes of the iso-cost curves
dA
dM
=
lT (T + h A) + hT (A  T   l)
M(lT  hT )
; (4)
which is positive and independent of demand realization q.
The right panel of Figure 1 depicts two iso-cost curves of bad and good types, respectively. The upward-
sloping and convex iso-cost curves illustrate the case where lT   hT = !(vl   vh) > 0. A provider raises
his average outcome A by dumping more l consumers. When !(vl   vh) > 0, it is more costly for both
G and B types to dump l consumers. A provider has to dump less consumers when he raises A along an
iso-cost curve. In addition, a G types iso-cost curve is steeper than that of a B type everywhere when
!(vl   vh) > 0. This is because the quality premium G reduces a good types relative cost of dumping an l
consumer (
l
G
hG
<
lB
hB
).23
When !(vl  vh) = 0, a providers costs of dumping h and l consumers are identical. The iso-cost curves
of both bad and good types become vertical lines. When I analyze this case in the following sections, I will
21Suppose the proportions of l consumers are di¤erent when a providers period-one demand is 1 and k, so that
points b and d in the panel shift either up or down. The qualitative results in this article continue to hold as long as
Lemma 1 is satised.
22The case where a provider has private information about his quality type, his demand, and the distribution
of his consumers characteristics is beyond the scope of this article. However, I will consider the implications of
provider-consumer matching in Section 7.
23Let Gh 6= Gl, a good type has a lower relative cost of dumping l consumers if Gl
Gh
<
lB
h
B
. Because lB   hB =
!(vl   vh)  0, a good type can have a lower relative cost of dumping l consumers even if he has a comparative
advantage in serving l consumers (Gh < Gl).
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impose a tie-breaking rule by which a provider who is indi¤erent between dumping an h and an l consumer
will dump the l consumer. Finally, the slopes of the iso-cost curves have an immediate implication.
Lemma 2 There is no equilibrium in which a B1 provider and a G1 provider obtain identical performance
reports.
To see why this lemma is true, consider the right panel of Figure 1 again. Suppose point e represents the
equilibrium reports of both B1 and G1 providers. In period two, consumers must have the same perceptions
about their quality types. Now if the G1 provider moves to point f on his Good-type iso-cost curve, his
dumping cost remains unchanged, but the new report is infeasible for the B1 provider to obtain. Hence the
G1 provider can raise his expected demand in period two by deviating from point e to point f, which is a
contradiction.
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that both B1 and Gk providers cannot pool with other providers, and hence they
must serve all their consumers in any equilibrium. I will next consider the inter-period trade-o¤s of Bk and
G1 providers and characterize the equilibrium outcomes.
4 Equilibrium performance report and dumping
There are two classes of equilibria. In a partial pooling equilibrium, both Bk and G1 providers obtain
identical performance reports. In a separating equilibrium, a providers quality type is completely revealed.
I rst study partial pooling equilibria.
Partial pooling equilibria
In a partial pooling equilibrium, B1 and Gk providers obtain distinctive reports, but Bk and G1 providers
obtain a common level of report (Mp; Ap). Consumers in period two cannot ascertain a providers quality
type from (Mp; Ap). Because of the di¤erences in quality and demand between Bk and G1 providers, at
least one of them dumps consumers in period one.
I rst characterize equilibria with the consumersbeliefs that a provider with any o¤-equilibrium report
is a bad type. Given the beliefs, the following two incentive constraints summarize the inter-period incentive
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trade-o¤s of Bk and G1 providers, respectively:
DhBk(Mp; Ap)
h
B +D
l
Bk(Mp; Ap)
l
B  (1 )(1 )+(1 ) GbqbB ; (5)
DhG1(Mp; Ap)
h
G +D
l
G1(Mp; Ap)
l
G  (1 )(1 )+(1 ) GbqbG; (6)
where bT  hT + (1  )lT is a T providers expected payo¤ from serving a consumer in period two.
On the left-hand sides of (5) and (6) are the equilibrium dumping costs in period one of Bk and G1
providers, respectively. According to (2), the masses of h and l consumers that a provider has to dump to
obtain (Mp; Ap) depend on both his quality type T and demand q. If Mp = q, a Tq provider dumps no
consumer in equilibrium and has no protable deviation. If Mp < q, the providers most protable deviation
is to serve all consumers in period one. However, he will be perceived as a bad type and lose consumers in
period two.
On the right-hand sides of (5) and (6) are the penalties of deviations for Bk and G1 providers, respectively.
In a partial pooling equilibrium, consumers in period two infer that a provider with report (Mp; Ap) is a
good type with probability (1 )(1 )+(1 ) , where  and 1    are respectively the prior probabilities that
a providers quality type is G and demand is 1. The consumers also believe that a provider with any o¤-
equilibrium report is a bad type with probability one. Thus, a provider who unilaterally deviates expects
to lose (1 )(1 )+(1 ) Gbq consumers in period two. I let (k   1) < Gbq. The inequality ensures the Perfect
Report benchmark is not always the unique equilibrium outcome of the game. I also rule out the corner
solution where a provider is willing to dump all l consumers in period one by assuming
GbqbT < (1  )qlT (7)
for both Gq and Bk providers. Finally, the reports (Mp; Ap) also have to be infeasible for a B1 provider. The
following proposition characterizes partial pooling equilibria with the assumption that condition (3) holds.
Proposition 1 A continuum of partial pooling equilibria exists if p   <  , where p is given by (8). In
the least-dumping-cost equilibrium, a G1 provider serves all his consumers in period one, and a Bk provider
dumps k 1 of his period-one consumers. The least-cost equilibrium defeats all other partial pooling equilibria.
Figure 2 illustrates the (M;A) pairs that can be supported as the partial pooling equilibrium reports
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Figure 2: Partial pooling equilibrum reports
of Bk and G1 providers. This is the shaded region in the diagram. First, an equilibrium report has to be
feasible for a G1 provider to obtain. Therefore, the region is bounded by the two solid curves above and
below. When condition (3) in Lemma 1 holds, the reports in the region are also feasible for a Bk provider,
hence the dashed curve in the diagram is not binding. To make the report infeasible for a B1 provider, the
region is also bounded by the dotted curve in the southwest.
Now consider the incentive constraints of Bk and G1 providers, conditions (5) and (6), in Figure 2.24
Both constraints place restrictions on the maximum masses of consumers that the providers can dump in
equilibrium. However, a Bk provider has to dump more consumers to obtain any report (Mp; Ap) that is
feasible for a G1 provider. Therefore, the existence of partial pooling equilibria depends only on the position
of (5) relative to point a. In the gure, partial pooling equilibria exist because the constraint is on the
left-hand side of point a. Substituting M = 1 and A = G+ bs into (5), I nd that partial pooling equilibria
exist if p   <  , where
p 
(k   1)bB + Gh l (lB  hB)
(1 )
(1 )+(1 )GbqbB : (8)
Partial pooling equilibria exist only if consumers are responsive to quality di¤erence (p  ). This
is because the bigger is  , the more consumers a deviating provider loses in period two. The value of p
depends on both provider and consumer attributes. The denominator is from the right-hand side of (5). It
24Figure 2 and Figure 3 are drawn with the assumption that !(vl   vh) > 0, and hence the incentive constraints
are curved.
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shows that p is decreasing in a Bk providers expected cost of deviation. The numerator shows that 

p is
increasing in Gh l (
l
B   hB). This is because the bigger is Gh l , the more l consumers a Bk provider has to
dump to mimic a G1 provider. The di¤erence, lB  hB , accounts for the incremental cost of dumping more
l consumers from a Bk providers perspective. However, partial pooling equilibria cannot exist (  p)
when lB  hB is very big, or (1 )(1 )+(1 ) is very small.
In Figure 2 where p   <  , each (M;A) pair in the shaded region corresponds to the partial pooling
equilibrium report of an equilibrium. I now apply the undefeated equilibrium renement to select the most
plausible equilibrium report. An equilibrium in this game is defeated if: (i) in the equilibrium there exist
an o¤-equilibrium report (fM; eA) that is obtained by a Bk provider, a G1 provider, or both in another
equilibrium; (ii) the payo¤s of all providers who obtain (fM; eA) in the alternative equilibrium are weakly
higher than their payo¤s in the original equilibrium, and strictly higher for at least one of them; and (iii)
the consumers beliefs about a provider with report (fM; eA) in the original and alternative equilibria are
di¤erent.25
These criteria permit the equilibrium represented by point a in Figure 2 to defeat all other partial pooling
equilibria. This is because point a allows both Bk and G1 providers to minimize their respective dumping
costs in the shaded region. Therefore, any equilibrium is defeated if the consumersbeliefs after observing
the report at point a are more pessimistic than the beliefs on the equilibrium path. To obtain the report
at point a, a G1 provider always serves all his consumers, and a Bk provider dumps k   1 of his consumers
in period one. By condition (1), the masses of l and h consumers a Bk provider dumps in period one are
(k   1)(1  ) + Gh l and (k   1)  Gh l , respectively.26
25Because I focus on symmetric equilibria, the reports (fM; eA) of Providers x and y, which are o¤ equilibrium path
in the original equilibrium, must also be symmetric. Moreover, the incentives of B1 and Gk providers can be ignored
because they serve all consumers in every equilibrium.
26 In the Supplement, I show that the least-cost equilibrium cannot be eliminated by the intuitive criterion if a
su¢ cient condition holds. However, the intuitive criterion can also fail to eliminate other partial pooling equilibria.
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Separating equilibria
In a separating equilibrium, each providers quality type is fully revealed through his performance report.
The period-two outcomes in any informative equilibrium and the Perfect Report benchmark are identical.
Because dumping is costly, no provider is willing to manipulate his report by dumping consumers in period
one, and to be perceived as a bad type in period two. Thus in any separating equilibrium, a Bk provider
always serves all consumers in period one. The question remains: Does a G1 provider always serves all his
consumers?
Let the equilibrium report of a G1 provider be (MG1; AG1) and that it is not feasible for a B1 provider to
obtain the report. I rst construct separating equilibria with the consumersbeliefs that a provider with any
o¤-equilibrium report is a bad type. Given this belief, the following inequalities summarize the inter-period
incentive trade-o¤s of Bk and G1 providers, respectively:
DhBk(MG1; AG1)
h
B +D
l
Bk(MG1; AG1)
l
B  GbqbB ; (9)
DhG1(MG1; AG1)
h
G +D
l
G1(MG1; AG1)
l
G  GbqbG: (10)
The best unilateral deviations are not protable if both conditions (9) and (10) hold.
First consider (9). In any separating equilibrium, a Bk provider serves all his consumers in period
one. With the pessimistic consumersbeliefs, a Bk providers best unilateral deviation is to obtain report
(MG1; AG1). The deviating Bk provider could raise his expected demand in period two by Gbq, irrespective
of his opponent providers quality type.27 The right-hand side of (9) describes the benet of this deviation.
But the Bk provider has to dump some of his consumers in period one in order to obtain (MG1; AG1). The
left-hand side of (9) describes the cost.
Now consider (10). In a separating equilibrium, a G1 provider dumps DsG1(MG1; AG1) of his s consumers
in period one. If MG1 = 1, a G1 provider dumps no consumer and has no protable deviation. If MG1 < 1,
a G1 providers best unilateral deviation is to serve all his consumers in period one. The left-hand side of
27The expected demand increases from (1   G)bq to bq if the opponent is a G type, and from bq to (1 + G)bq if
the opponent is a B type; see Table 2. The change in expected demand of a G1 provider in the next paragraph is
analogous.
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(10) describes the benet of serving more period-one consumers. However, the G1 provider will be perceived
as a bad type in period two. The right-hand side of (10) describes the cost of losing consumers in period
two. The following proposition characterizes the separating equilibria with the assumption that condition
(3) holds.
Proposition 2 A continuum of separating equilibria always exists. At each  , the least-dumping-cost equi-
librium defeats all other separating equilibria. Suppose   s where s is given by (11). The providers
always serve all consumers. Suppose s <  <  . A G1 provider dumps a proportion of his l consumers in
period one to satisfy (9) as an equality.
Figure 3 illustrates the construction of separating equilibria. First consider the left panel. The shaded
region shows the combinations of M and A that can be supported as a G1 providers equilibrium report
(MG1; AG1). Starting from point a, the two solid curves bound the combinations ofM and A that are feasible
for a G1 provider to obtain. Constraint (10) restricts the maximum masses of consumers that a G1 provider
can dump in equilibrium. Constraint (9) restricts the minimum masses of consumers that a G1 provider has
to dump to deter a Bk provider from mimicking him. In this diagram   s, where
s 
(k   1)bB + Gh l (lB  hB)
GbqbB : (11)
Because consumers are less responsive to quality di¤erence, (9) is not binding, and is on the left-hand side
of point a in the diagram.
The right panel of Figure 3 illustrates a case where s <  <  . When consumers are responsive to
quality di¤erence, (9) binds. In the diagram, any combination of M and A to the left of the Bk providers
incentive constraint cannot be supported as a G1 providers equilibrium report. Consumersresponsiveness
also shifts (10) to the right. In the diagram, the shaded region is now bounded by the dotted curve to make
(MG1; AG1) infeasible for a B1 provider. Finally, if lB  hB in (9) is so big that   s, a Bk provider will
not nd it protable to mimic a G1 provider at any degree of demand responsiveness.
Figure 3 also shows the results of undefeated equilibrium renement when s <  . Here, as in Spences
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Figure 3: Separating equilibrium reports
(1973) education signalling game, the least-cost equilibrium defeats all other equilibria at every  .28 In the left
panel where   s, a G1 provider accepts all consumers in the least-cost equilibrium, and point a represents
his equilibrium report. In the right panel where s <  <  , the least-cost equilibrium report (MG1; AG1)
must satisfy (9) as an equality. By condition (4), a good provider has a steeper iso-cost curve. Therefore,
the report that minimizes a G1 providers equilibrium dumping cost is at point g. In this equilibrium, a
G1 provider dumps only l consumers to raise his average outcome and separate from a Bk provider. The
expression of DlG1(MG1; AG1) is given by (A1) in the Appendix.
5 Provider strategic response and consumer welfare
Demand for and supply of quality
I now relate consumer equilibrium welfare to the demand responsiveness,  , and the probability that a
provider is a good type, .29 By Proposition 1, the least-cost partial pooling equilibrium exists only if
p   <  . By Proposition 2, a least-cost separating equilibrium exists at each  and dumping occurs only
if s <  <  . Because 

s =
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) 

p, the Perfect Report benchmark is achieved only if   s.
28The intuitive criterion also eliminates all but the least-cost separating equilibrium at every  . The proof is
standard and omitted.
29 In the model, a providers payo¤s consist of his consumersnet payo¤s. Therefore, I consider consumer welfare
rather than total welfare to avoid the problem of double counting. See, for example, Hammond (1987) and Milgrom
(1993).
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Figure 4: Consumer welfare in the benchmarks and undefeated equilibria
When s <  <  , the benchmark is unattainable. Here, the undefeated equilibrium renement can be
further applied to the two classes of least-cost equilibria to sharpen the welfare analysis.
Proposition 3 The Perfect Report benchmark is achieved only if   s. Suppose s <  <  , so that
the rst best cannot be an equilibrium. At every  , there is an , 0 <  < 1, such that the least-cost
separating equilibrium defeats the least-cost partial pooling equilibrium if  < , and the least-cost partial
pooling equilibrium defeats the least-cost separating equilibrium if  < .
Figure 4 compares the expected consumer welfare in the least-cost equilibria with the benchmark cases
at di¤erent  and a xed  , where s <  <  . The upper solid curve, WPR(), represents consumer welfare
under Perfect Report. The dashed curve,WNR(), represents consumer welfare under No Report. Welfare in
both benchmarks is increasing in . However, WPR() is higher than WNR() at every  by 2(1 )G2bq,
the welfare gain from quality information dissemination in period two.30
The solid curve Wp() represents consumer welfare in the least-cost partial pooling equilibrium, which
exists only if  is big. Comparing Wp() to the Perfect Report benchmark, there are two sources of welfare
loss. First, consumers in period two cannot distinguish Bk and G1 providers from their common reports
30 In the expression, 2(1   ) is the probability that Providers x and y are of di¤erent quality types, Gbq is the
expected mass of period-two consumers who switch from a bad type to a good type upon learning the providers
types, and G is the welfare gain of these consumers.
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(Mp; Ap).31 Second, a Bk provider dumps k   1 of his consumers in period one to obtain (Mp; Ap). The
solid curve Ws() represents consumer welfare in the least-cost separating equilibrium. Period-two welfare
in this equilibrium and under Perfect Report are identical. However, a G1 provider dumps DlG1(MG1; AG1)
of his period-one l consumers in equilibrium. Hence, the di¤erence betweenWs() andWPR() is increasing
in .32
Now consider the undefeated equilibrium renement when both classes of least-cost equilibria exist.
According to (5), a Bk providers gain from pooling with a G1 provider outweighs the cost of dumping k  1
of his consumers. Therefore, a Bk provider always prefers the partial pooling equilibrium to the separating
equilibrium. On the other hand, a G1 providers preference between the two equilibria is determined by
the value of . When  is smaller than the critical value  in Proposition 3, the incremental benet from
separation (1 )(1 )+(1 ) GbqbG (the di¤erence between the right-hand sides of (10) and (6)) is larger than
the corresponding dumping cost DlG1(MG1; AG1)
l
G (which is independent of , see (A1) in the Appendix).
Thus, a G1 provider strictly prefers the separating report (MG1; AG1) to the partial pooling report (Mp; Ap),
and the least-cost partial pooling equilibrium is defeated. However, a G1 providers benet from separation
must be smaller than the corresponding dumping cost when  is larger than . Here, the partial pooling
report (Mp; Ap), which is preferred by both Bk and G1 providers to their separating reports, enables the
least-cost partial pooling equilibrium to defeat the least-cost separating equilibrium.
This critical value  is characterized in (A4) in the Appendix and illustrated in Figure 4. In the gure,
the average quality of providers is low on the left-hand side of , and Ws() depicts consumer welfare in
the unique undefeated separating equilibrium. On the right-hand side of , the average quality is high and
Wp() shows consumer welfare in the unique undefeated partial pooling equilibrium.33 In general, the value
of  is di¤erent from the  at which Wp() and Ws() intersect. This is because  is based on the payo¤s
31The welfare gain from quality information dissemination in a partial pooling equilibrium is 2(1  
)Gbq h2(G  (1 )
(1 )+(1 )G) + (1  )G+ (1  )2 (1 )(1 )+(1 )G
i
= 2(1  )G2bq (1 )2+(1 )2
(1 )+(1 ) .
32Suppose some of the l consumers receive a negative payo¤ from the service, ceteris paribus. Consumer welfare
increases when the providers dump these consumers. Hence, when there are su¢ cient negative-payo¤ consumers in
the market, the least-cost equilibrium welfare Wp() and Ws() can be higher than WPR() at some .
33The two least-cost equilibria are both undefeated at .
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of a G1 provider, whereas Wp() and Ws() are the welfare of consumers served by all providers. Finally,
the comparison between consumer welfare in equilibrium and under No Report depends on the values of
quality premium G, and consumer welfare loss from being dumped UsT . Figure 4 considers a case where G
is small relative to UsB . Hence, Wp() and Ws() in the gure are lower than WNR() in the intermediate
range of .34
Provider motivation
I next relate the least-cost equilibria and consumer welfare to !, the weight that a provider assigns to his
consumersnet payo¤s.
Corollary 1 Suppose vh < vl. If ! decreases, the values of p and 

s decrease, and there is more dumping
in the least-cost separating equilibria when  > s.
When ! decreases, a provider puts less weight on his consumersnet payo¤s T + vs and more weight on
his own prots P . This lowers a providers relative cost of dumping l consumers, who benet more from
the services when vh < vl, and rotates the incentive constraints in Figures 2 and 3 counterclockwise. In
particular, a lower ! allows a Bk provider to dump more l consumers to pool with, or mimic, a G1 provider
at every  . This lowers the values of p and 

s in Propositions 1 and 2. When  > 

s, a G1 provider has to
dump more l consumers to deter mimicry in the least-cost separating equilibrium.35 In terms of consumer
welfare, the two benchmark cases are independent of !. However, a decrease in ! extends Wp() in Figure
4 to the left through its e¤ect on p. A lower ! also downshifts Ws() in the gure because of the increase
in dumping.
Corollary 1 shows that although providersintrinsic motivation can mitigate dumping, it does not change
the least-cost equilibrium outcomes qualitatively. This is because under performance reporting, the incentive
34The dotted curve WAR() in Figure 4 will be dened and analyzed in Section 7.
35An increase in P rotates the incentive constraints in the same way as a decrease in !. However, an increase in
P in period one only raises the absolute costs of dumping, and hence, raises the values of p and 

s and lowers the
value of DlG1(MG1; AG1).
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trade-o¤s that determine the equilibrium outcomes are inter-period in nature.36 Nevertheless, the e¤ect of
providersmotivation on the value of  in Proposition 3 is generally ambiguous. This is because a lower !
reduces both the incremental gain from separation and the corresponding dumping cost of a G1 provider.
Now suppose ! is xed and vh increases. This raises a providers expected payo¤ in period two, and
lowers his cost of dumping l consumers relative to h consumers in period one. The two e¤ects rotate the
incentive constraints in Figures 2 and 3, and alter the least-cost equilibria in the same way as a decrease in !
in Corollary 1 as long as !(vl vh) > 0.37 , 38 Using (4), I can further consider the case where !(vl vh) < 0.
Here, the providersincentive constraints will become downward sloping in the gures. This will not a¤ect
the level of the least-cost partial pooling equilibrium report. However, in the least-cost separating equilibria
where the Bk providers incentive constraint binds, a G1 provider will deter a Bk providers mimicry by
dumping h consumers to lower his average service outcome. This appears implausible.
Finally, consider the limiting case where ! = 0. When the providers are purely prot maximizing, the
incentive constraints in Figures 2 and 3 become vertical. Propositions 1 to 3 continue to hold. However, the
expressions for p and 

s in (8) and (11) can be respectively simplied to
k 1
Gbq
.
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) and
k 1
Gbq .
The long expression for DlG1(MG1; AG1) in the Appendix can also be simplied to Gbq   (k   1).39 I will
focus on this case in the next section to keep the analysis tractable.
36 If the providers are purely altruistic as dened by Andreoni (1989), a Bk who assigns a su¢ ciently big weight
to consumer welfare cannot benet from mimicking or pooling with a G1 provider. In this case, the Perfect Report
benchmark is the unique equilibrium at every  .
37This is because
@p
@!
=
@p
@vh
h
  (vl vh)P
!l
B
i
(and note that s =
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) 

p), and
@DlG1
@!
=
@DlG1
@vh
h
  (vl vh)P
!l
B
i
.
38Alternatively, let the providersprots from serving l and h consumers be P l and Ph, respectively. Keeping Ph
xed, an increase in P l rotates the incentive constraints in Figures 2 and 3 clockwise. Hence, allowing providers to
earn more from serving l consumers can mitigate dumping incentives.
39This is a result of the tie-breaking rule I introduced in Section 3 before Lemma 2. The rule makes DlG1(MG1; AG1)
continuous in ! when ! approaches one.
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6 Adjusted average performance report
Statistical adjustment
So far, I have illustrated how providers can make use of consumer heterogeneity to game their performance
reports in equilibrium. In practice, many reporting agencies address consumer heterogeneity by statistically
adjusting performance reports. These statistical techniques are employed to make a providers average service
outcome independent of his consumerscharacteristics. The merit of statistical adjustment is well received.
If the adjustment can account for the di¤erences in consumer characteristics, a performance report will be
more informative about a providers quality. A provider will have less incentive to dump consumers who
can dampen his average performance. This section analyzes providersdumping behavior under adjusted
average outcome reporting. I will show that informative statistical adjustments can lead to less informative
reports, more dumping, or both.
Statistical adjustments separate consumer characteristics and provider quality in two steps: First, a
reporting agency uses a statistical model to estimate a consumers service outcome with a set of observable
variables. The statistical model predicts the consumers expected service outcome that is independent of her
providers identity. Second, a providers adjusted average outcome is calculated as the di¤erence between the
actual and expected average outcomes of his consumers. For example, reporting agencies in the health care
sector use age, gender, and comorbidities to estimate patientsmortality rates; they then report the di¤erence
between the expected and actual mortality rates as a providers risk-adjusted performance. Agencies in the
education sector use past exam scores to estimate studentscurrent test scores; they then report the di¤erence
between the expected and actual test scores as a teachers value-added score.
In the following, I model an observable variable (such as age or past test score) as an exogenous public
signal about a consumers characteristic (such as health status or learning ability).40 The signal has two
possible realizations  2 fL;Hg. An l consumer and an h consumer obtain signal realization L with prob-
abilities 1   " and ", respectively. I assume 0  " < 12 . By the Bayesrule, a consumer with signal L is
40This is in line with the theoretical literature on statistical adjustment (see, for example, Glazer and McGuire,
2000).
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more likely to have characteristic l than a consumer with signal H. Hence, the signal is informative about
consumer characteristic that is not observable by the reporting agency. The parameter " can be interpreted
as the signals noise. The values of L and H are the expected service outcomes of the consumers with those
signal realizations. I let l  L < H  h.
A providers adjusted performance report is about the mass of consumers he has served in period one,
M , and the adjusted average outcome of these consumers, AA. The adjusted average outcome is the average
di¤erence between the actual outcome (T + s) and expected outcome  of the served consumers. The values
of " and  are commonly known. In each period, each provider observes both the characteristic and signal
of any consumer who requests his service. A provider then decides whether to dump each of his consumers
as before. However, a provider can now base his dumping decision on a consumers signal realization too. If
a Tq provider dumps DsTq of his s consumers with signal  in period one, his performance report is
(M;AA) =
0BBB@ q  DhHTq  DhLTq DlHTq  DlLTq ;
f(1  ")q  DhHTq g(T + h H) + f"q  DhLTqg(T + h  L)
+f(1  )"q  DlHTqg(T + l  H) + f(1  )(1  ")q  DlLTqg(T + l   L)
q  DhHTq  DhLTq  DlHTq  DlLTq
1CCCA :
(12)
In period two, consumers infer a providers quality type from his performance report (M;AA). Other aspects
of the game are as in Section 2. The Perfect Report and No Report benchmarks in Section 3 continue to
apply.
Perfect adjustment
I begin with a benchmark case where the signal is perfectly informative about the consumer characteristic.
Lemma 3 Suppose " = 0, L = l, and H = h. The Adjusted Average Outcome Reporting game has a unique
equilibrium in which a providers adjusted average outcome is his quality type T , and the Perfect Report
benchmark is always achieved.
If " = 0, all l consumers receive signal L, and all h consumers receive signal H. Suppose L = l and
H = h. When a provider serves a consumer, the adjusted outcome is always T . In other words, the perfect
statistical adjustment completely separates provider quality from consumer characteristic. There is no room
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for report manipulation. In equilibrium, the providers always serve all consumers, as under the Perfect
Report benchmark.
Imperfect adjustment and gaming feasibility
If 0 < " < 12 , the signal is still informative about the consumer characteristic. However, h and l consumers
now receive signal realizations L and H, respectively, with probability ". If a Tq provider serves all his
consumers in period one, his performance report is now M = q and AA = T + bs   b, where b  f(1  
")H + "Lg+(1 )f(1  ")L+ "Hg is the expected value of the signal. Because of the di¤erences in quality
T and demand q, it is still impossible for B1 and Gk providers to pool with other providers in equilibrium.
Now consider Bk and G1 providers. Under average outcome reporting, Lemma 1 introduces condition
(3), which allows a Bk provider to mimic a G1 provider who serves all consumers. The equilibrium analysis
in Section 4 shows that condition (3) is necessary for the Perfect Report benchmark to be unattainable. Now
return to adjusted average outcome reporting. The following lemma considers the condition under which a
Bk provider can mimic a G1 provider who serves all consumers.
Lemma 4 Continue to assume that k  1 < k(1 ). Under adjusted outcome reporting, the report of a G1
provider who serves all his consumers can be mimicked by a Bk provider who dumps some of his consumers
if
G  (k   1)(h  l) + [Minf(k   1)("+ (1  )(1  ")); (1  )"  (k   1)(1  ")g  (H   L)] : (13)
The value of the square-bracket term in (13) is negative if and only if " < "  (k 1)(k 1)+(1 )= .
A providers adjusted average outcome depends on the signal realizations of the consumers whom he
chooses to serve. This accounts for the extra square-bracket term in (13) compared to (3) in Lemma 1.
Because of the quality di¤erence, a Bk provider has to mimic a G1 provider who serves all consumers by
raising his adjusted average from bs   b to G + bs   b. Consider his consumersadjusted outcomes, s   .
They are ranked as l  H < l   L < h H < h  L because l  L < H  h. Therefore, a Bk provider can
raise his adjusted average the most by rst dumping his l consumers with signal H, and then dumping his l
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consumers with signal L.41
To compare the e¤ects of dumping an additional l consumer on a Bk providers average and adjusted
average, I di¤erentiate A in (1) with respect to DlBk and AA in (12) with respect to D
lH
Bk and D
lL
Bk for a
xed ". I then evaluate the derivatives at the same mass of dumped consumers under the two regimes and
get
@A
@DlBk
<
@AA
@DlHBk

DlBk=D
lH
Bk
and
@A
@DlBk
>
@AA
@DlLBk

DlBk=k(1 )"+DlLBk
: (14)
The rst inequality in (14) indicates that signal H makes dumping an l consumer a more e¤ective way of
gaming at the margin. This is because the reporting agency expects a consumer with signal H to have an
above-average service outcome (b < H), and hence, dumping the consumer raises a Bk providers adjusted
average more. The second inequality of (14) indicates that it is less e¤ective to game the adjusted average
at the margin by dumping an l consumer with signal L. This is because the reporting agency expects a
consumer with signal L to have a below-average service outcome (L < b).42
The size of " determines the total e¤ect of dumping a given proportion of l consumers on a Bk providers
adjusted average, as compared to his unadjusted average. Figure 5 visualizes this comparison. In the left
panel, the left and right axes denote A and AA, respectively. The curve ABk represents the average outcome
that a Bk provider can obtain by dumping l consumers. The curve AABk represents the adjusted average
outcome that the same provider can obtain by dumping l consumers. The shapes of the two curves illustrate
the inequalities in condition (14). AABk is steeper than ABk only if a Bk provider dumps less than k(1 )"
of his l consumers.
The left panel is a case where " < ". Here, the public signal is su¢ ciently informative about the consumer
characteristic. The proportion of l consumers who receive signal H is small relative to the di¤erence in
demand k  1. The value of the square-bracket term in (13) is negative, hence (13) implies (3) in Lemma 1.
In the diagram, point a is below ABk but above AABk. A Bk provider can mimic a G1 providers average
41Moreover, as long as (7) holds, a Bk provider would have no incentive to dump h consumers to raise his adjusted
average.
42The two inequalities in (14) are k(h l)
M2
< k[(h l)+f"+(1 )(1 ")g(H L)]
M2
and k(h l)
M2
> k[(h l) (1 ")(H L)]
M2
,
respectively.
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Figure 5: Feasibility of gaming in the two reporting regimes
outcome but not his adjusted average outcome at that point.
The right panel is a case where " < ". This case is nontrivial because k   1 < k(1  ) implies " < 12 .
Here, the public signal is still informative about the consumer characteristic. However, the signal noise is
su¢ ciently big, so that the value of the square-bracket term in (13) is positive, and (3) in Lemma 1 implies
(13). In the diagram, point a is below AABk but above ABk. A Bk provider can mimic a G1 providers
adjusted average outcome but not his average outcome at point a.
The value of " in Lemma 4 is independent of the expected service outcomes H and L. However, their
di¤erence, H   L, determines the absolute value of the square-bracket term in (13). The larger is H   L,
the larger are the absolute di¤erences between ABk and AABk in the two panels of Figure 5, hence the more
likely that a Bk provider is able to mimic a G1 provider in only one of the two reporting regimes. I will next
compare the equilibria under the two reporting regimes.
Imperfect adjustment and equilibria
The constructions of equilibria under adjusted outcome reporting are essentially the same as before. In
a partial pooling equilibrium, the report (Mp; AAp) has to be feasible for both Bk and G1 providers. In
a separating equilibrium, the report (MG1; AAG1) has to be feasible for a G1 provider. Finally, in all
the incentive constraints in Section 4, the expressions DsTq(M;A) have to be replaced by fDsLTq(M;AA) +
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DsHTq (M;AA)g that are derived from (12). Section 5 has shown that the least-cost equilibria under average
outcome reporting have the same qualitative properties as long as !(vl   vh) is nonnegative. To economize
notation and facilitate comparison, I will characterize equilibria under adjusted outcome reporting by setting
! = 0. I continue to apply the undefeated equilibrium renement to multiple equilibria.
Proposition 4 Suppose condition (13) holds and ! = 0. If
H   L < 1
1  "

(h  l)  G(1  (1  )")
(k   1)

; (15)
then the statements of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 continue to characterize the undefeated partial pooling and
separating equilibria under adjusted outcome reporting.
The proposition says that when a Bk provider can mimic a G1 provider who accepts all consumers, the
two reporting regimes lead to the same levels of dumping and report informativeness as long as inequality (15)
holds. Figure 6 explains the intuition. In the left panel, the dashed curve AABk has the same interpretation
as in Figure 5. The solid curve AAG1 represents the adjusted average that a G1 provider can obtain by
dumping l consumers, and it has the same shape as AABk.
Given ! = 0, the two vertical solid lines, ICBk Pool and ICBk Sep respectively represent (5) and (9) under
average outcome reporting. Point a is the partial pooling equilibrium average outcome report (Mp; Ap) as
in Figure 2, and point g is the separating equilibrium average outcome report (MG1; AG1) as in Figure 3
(however, the incentive constraint is vertical here but curved in Figures 2 and 3). Because the cost and
expected benet of dumping are the same under the two reporting regimes, the two vertical solid lines also
represent a Bk providers incentive constraints under adjusted outcome reporting.
The left panel is a case where inequality (15) holds. This su¢ cient condition guarantees that AABk is
higher than AAG1 in the relevant range. Here, under adjusted outcome reporting, point a also represents the
least-cost partial pooling report (Mp; AAp) that defeats all other equilibrium reports in its class. In addition,
point h in the panel represents the least-cost separating report (MG1; AAG1) that satises the tie-breaking
rule. Because points g and h are on the same vertical line, a G1 provider dumps the same proportion of
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Figure 6: Comparing equilibrium reports and dumpings in the two reporting regimes
consumers in equilibrium under the two regimes. The consumer welfare analysis in Section 5 follows.43
Condition (15) requires the range of expected service outcomes, H L, to be smaller than a critical value.
This critical value is (h  l)  G(k 1) when " is zero (which is strictly positive if (3) holds), and is increasing
in ". Hence, the bigger is ", the more likely that (15) holds. The right panel of Figure 6 shows an example
where (15) is violated. In the panel, AABk and AAG1 intersect on the left-hand side of ICBk Sep. Point h
can no longer be a separating equilibrium report. A G1 provider can achieve separation by the report at
point i, which is infeasible for a Bk provider. Because a G1 provider dumps less consumers at point i than
at point g, the report at point i may defeat the partial pooling equilibrium report at point a even if  is
larger than  in Proposition 3.
Corollary 2 Consider the undefeated equilibria under the two reporting regimes when ! = 0. (i) If (3) is
satised but (13) is not, dumping and pooling can occur only if the reports are unadjusted. (ii) If both (3) and
(13) are satised and (15) holds, the two regimes lead to the same levels of dumping, report informativeness,
and consumer welfare. (iii) If (13) is satised but (3) is not, dumping and pooling can occur only if the
reports are adjusted.
43When !(vl   vh) > 0, the slopes of a providers iso-dumping-cost curves are generally di¤erent under the two
reporting regimes. This leads to a small di¤erence in the MG1 and the least-cost separating equilibrium welfare under
the two regimes.
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This corollary follows directly from Lemma 4 and Proposition 4. According to Lemma 4, (3) holds
and (13) fails simultaneously only if " is small. This is the only case where statistical adjustment can
unambiguously eliminate gaming. When " is big and (13) is satised, the power of statistical adjustment is
counter-balanced by the providersstrategy response. Statistical adjustment can completely fail to mitigate
dumping, as illustrated by the left panel of Figure 6. It can even lead to more dumping in equilibrium by
allowing a Bk provider to mimic a G1 provider, as illustrated in the right panel of Figure 5.
7 Discussion and concluding remarks
Testable predictions
I now consider some testable predictions of the model. I rst show that the least-cost partial pooling and
separating equilibria under both reporting regimes generate di¤erent correlations between service volumes
and average outcomes.
Corollary 3 Compared to the Perfect Report and No Report benchmarks, the least-cost partial pooling equi-
libria under both reporting regimes generate more positive correlations between service volumes and average
outcomes in the market; whereas the least-cost separating equilibria with dumping under both reporting regimes
generate more negative correlations between service volumes and average outcomes in the market.
These correlations occur because in a least-cost partial pooling equilibrium, it is a Bk provider who
reduces volume to raise his average outcome, but in a least-cost separating equilibrium, it is a G1 provider
who reduces volume to raise his average outcome. The surgery volume-outcome relationship is well studied
in health services research. For example, Marcin et al. (2008) nd that after California replaced its voluntary
cardiac surgery outcome report cards with mandatory report cards in 2003, the correlation between volume
and survival rate in the state has became more positive. This observation is consistent with a least-cost
partial pooling equilibrium outcome.44
44There is a large literature that uses correlation between risk occurrence and coverage to test for the presence
of adverse selection in insurance markets. For recent reviews, see, for example, Cohen and Siegelman (2010), and
Chiappori and Salanie (2013).
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Consider next the observable implications when providers game their adjusted average performance re-
ports. According to condition (14), a provider can raise his adjusted average outcome more by dumping
l consumers with signal H than by dumping those with signal L. The following corollary shows that if
consumers with signal H are indeed more likely to be dumped, the market expected and actual average
outcomes will change in the opposite directions.
Corollary 4 Let Dl be the mass of l consumers with signal  2 fL;Hg who are being dumped in the
market. Compared to the Perfect Report and No Report benchmarks, the market actual and expected average
outcomes raises and falls, respectively, if
DlL
"+ (1  )(1  ") <
DlH
(1  ") + (1  )" : (16)
Recall that the adjusted average outcome is the di¤erence between the actual and expected average
outcomes, and that the expected outcome is the average  of the served consumers. When providers dump
l consumers, the actual average outcome increases irrespective of the consumers signal realizations. If
inequality (16) also holds, consumers with signal H are more likely to be dumped.45 Therefore, the average
 of the served consumers will decrease with dumping, and the divergence between actual and expected
outcomes will lead to a signicant increase in the adjusted average outcome. This phenomenon has been
observed in New York State after the introduction of cardiac surgery report cards in 1989 (Hannan et al.,
1994). The mechanism in the corollary raises caution about interpreting an increase in adjusted average as
a clear evidence of quality improvement.46
Reporting average outcomes only
Returning to Table 1. The analysis so far has focused on report categories 1 and 2. Now consider report
categories 3 and 4. Specically, let the reporting agency report only the average outcome A, or adjusted
outcome AA, but not the mass M . In either case, consumers in period two have to infer a providers quality
45The denominators on the left-hand and right-hand sides of (16) are the proportions of consumers who obtain
signal L and H, respectively.
46An alternative explanation is that hospitals have upcoded patient severities. However, an audit by the New York
State Department of Health in 1992 showed no signicant di¤erence between the expected survival rates based on
the hospitalscoding and the audited coding (Hannan et al., 1994).
35
type from a single number. This is also essentially identical to an agency rewarding or punishing providers
based on their average outcomes or adjusted average outcomes.47
When the agency does not report M , Gk and G1 providers who serve all consumers obtain the same
level of performance report (A = G + bs or AA = G + bs   b). Characterizing the equilibria is beyond the
scope of this section. The following corollary focuses on whether Bk and B1 providers can mimic Gk and
G1 providers or not.
Corollary 5 Continue to assume k   1 < k(1  ). Suppose the reporting agency reports average outcome
A only. The reports of Gk and G1 providers who serve all consumers are G+ bs. This level of report can be
mimicked by either Bk or B1 provider who dumps some of his consumers if
G  (1  )(h  l): (17)
This inequality implies (3) in Lemma 1. Now suppose the agency switches to report adjusted average outcome
AA only. The reports of Gk and G1 providers who serve all consumers become G+ bs  b. Either Bk or B1
provider can obtain this level of report by dumping less of his consumers if " > "AA  GG+(1 )(h l) .
Consider a Bk provider rst. The intuition of Corollary 5 is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 5.
There, ABk is lower than G + bs at M = 1. When the agency reports (M;A), it is not feasible for a Bk
provider to mimic a G1 providers report at point a. However, the ABk curve reaches A = G + bs at an M
below 1. When the agency reports only A, mimicry becomes feasible. Now let the agency switch to reporting
only AA. The value of "AA in the corollary is below 12 when inequality (17) holds. Recall that the right panel
of Figure 5 is a case where " is big, so the signal is su¢ ciently noisy. The AABk curve in the diagram shows
that a Bk provider can reach AA = G+ bs  b at an M above 1. Thus the imperfect statistical adjustment
allows a Bk provider to mimic a G1 provider by dumping less consumers.
Now consider a B1 provider, who can never mimic another Tq provider when the agency reports either
(M;A) or (M;AA). When M is not reported, a B1 provider can obtain any report that is feasible for a Bk
47 In addition to the JTPA program in Table 1, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services also introduced
minimum adjusted average survival standards on organ transplantations in 2007. Stith and Hirth (forthcoming) nd
that kidney transplant centers have responded to the standards by dumping sicker patients and performing fewer
transplantations.
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provider by dumping his consumers proportionately. Therefore, the conditions in Corollary 5 apply to a B1
provider as well.
Alternative reporting scheme
Although gaming becomes easier when the agency reports only A or AA, the agency can potentially elim-
inate dumping by reporting less information than (M;A) and (M;AA). Consider the following alternative
reporting scheme. The agency reports that a provider is Above Average if M  k and A  G + bs, Below
Average if M  1 and A Minfh; bs (1 M)lM g, and Average otherwise. The following corollary characterizes
the equilibrium outcome and consumer welfare under the scheme.
Corollary 6 A unique undefeated equilibrium exists under the alternative reporting scheme. In equilibrium,
the providers always serve all consumers, the reporting agency reports that a Gk provider is Above Average,
a B1 provider is Below Average, and both G1 and Bk providers are Average. Consumer equilibrium welfare
WAR() is higher than WNO() and Wp() dened in Section 5 at all . Moreover, WAR() is higher than
Ws() when  is big.
The expression Minfh; bs (1 M)lM g is the highest possible A that a B1 provider can obtain by dumping
l consumers at every M  1. Therefore, the scheme always designates a B1 provider as Below Average,
irrespective of his service decisions. On the other hand, M  k and A  G + bs are only feasible for a Gk
provider who serves all his consumers. This threshold also disables both G1 and Bk providers from improving
consumer perceptions by dumping consumers in period one. Because no provider can benet from dumping,
the scheme designates both G1 and Bk providers as Average, and conveys the same quality information as
the partial pooling reports do in Section 4.
The curve WAR() in Figure 4 illustrates consumer welfare under the alternative report scheme. In the
gure, WAR() is always lower than WPR() and higher than WNR(). This is because the three cases
involve no dumping in period one, so they are ranked only by consumer welfare in period two. In the same
gure, WAR() and Wp() share the same level of consumer welfare in period two. However, dumping
in period one makes Wp() always lower than WAR() when partial pooling equilibria exist. Finally, the
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comparison of WAR() and Ws() involves an inter-period trade-o¤. Consumers in period two learn more
from the separating equilibrium reports than from the alternative report scheme, but a G1 provider has to
dump consumers in period one in the most e¢ cient separating equilibrium when s <  <  . Figure 4 shows
that this trade-o¤ depends on the value of . When  is big the welfare loss from dumping is big and the
value of quality information is small (see Section 5), hence WAR() is higher than Ws().
Although the alternative reporting scheme may appear to be articial, it can be interpreted as a mecha-
nism that aggregates multidimensional information into coarse ratings.48 Corollary 6, along with Corollaries
2 and 5, show that the design of optimal reporting strategy is an important area for future research.
Matching
In the model, each provider receives service requests from consumers with an identical distribution of charac-
teristic. Therefore, the providersperformance reports (with and without statistical adjustment) are perfect
indicators of their quality types if they serve all consumers. In the area of education, Lang (2010) discusses
how teacher performance reports are biased when good and poor teachers are matched with students with
di¤erent distributions of learning ability. Biased performance reports can make gaming more feasible. To
see this, let the proportions of h consumers who visit G1 and Bk providers in period one be e and , respec-
tively. Under average outcome reporting, a Bk provider can mimic a G1 provider who serves all consumers
if G  (k   1)(h   l) + (   e)(h   l). This inequality is implied by (3) in Lemma 1 as long as e  , so
that a G1 provider is matched with less h consumers and more l consumers.
Policy makers and academic researchers often suggest that statistical adjustment can create a level playing
eld when providers are matched with di¤erent consumer distributions. This argument may not hold when
providers are strategic. Consider adjusted average outcome reporting and let k 1 < k(1 )" for simplicity.49
48Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010) show that coarse exam grading is optimal when students value status. Harbaugh
and Rasmusen (2014) nd that coarse quality certication can be more informative because it attracts more providers
to apply. In both articles information is unidimensional.
49The inequality says that the mass of l consumers with signal H who visit a provider Bk in period one is larger
than k   1.
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Using the same notation e. A Bk provider can mimic a G1 provider who serves all consumers if
G  (k   1)(h  l) + (k   1)["+ (1  )(1  ")](H   L) + (  e)[(h  l)  (1  2")(H   L)]:
Because " < 1=2 and H   L < h   l, the above inequality is also implied by (13) in Lemma 4 as long as
e  .
Concluding remarks
This article has developed a model to study the feasibility and incentive of provider gaming under di¤erent
performance reporting regimes. Sections 2 to 6 have analyzed report categories 1 and 2 in Table 1. I showed
that report category 1 can achieve the Perfect Report benchmark only when the intensity of competition
is low. When competition is strong, these reports may not eliminate quality information asymmetry, but
always lead to dumping. I then compared the equilibrium outcomes under report categories 1 and 2. I found
that inaccurate statistical adjustments can result in less informative reports but more dumping.
This section has further considered the testable implications of provider gaming, and how the feasibility
of gaming can be a¤ected by the content of performance reports and provider-consumer matching. These
results can be applied to the study and development of performance reports for physicians, hospitals, teachers,
schools, and other public service providers.
Throughout the article, I have assumed that a providers quality type is his private information. This
formulation ignores the possibility that a provider can learn his performance from his report and subsequently
improve his service quality, which is the key concern in Kolstad (2013). The design of performance reports
when providers can behave constructively and strategically remains an important task for future research.
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Appendix
This appendix contains omitted proofs.
Proof of Lemma 1: If a G1 provider serves all his consumers, his report is (1; G+bs). Let k 1 < k(1 )
and substitute DhBk = 0, D
l
Bk = k  1 into (1). A Bk providers report is now (1; k(h  l)+ l). The average
k(h  l) + l is not lower than G+ bs  G+ h+ (1  )l if G  (k   1)(h  l).
Proof of Proposition 1: (a) Existence. A partial pooling equilibrium report must be feasible for
both G1 and Bk providers, and satisfy conditions (5) and (6). Moreover, a B1 provider must nd it either
unprotable or infeasible to obtain the report.
I rst show that the report (1; G + bs) is feasible for both G1 and Bk providers, and infeasible for a B1
provider. By condition (2), a G1 provider can obtain report (1; G + bs) by serving all his consumers, and a
Bk provider can obtain the same report by choosing
DhBk(1; G+ bs) = (k   1)  Gh l and DlBk(1; G+ bs) = (k   1)(1  ) + Gh l :
Upon simplication, 0 < DhBk(1; G+bs) andDlBk(1; G+bs) < k(1 ) if k 1 < k(1 ) and G  (k 1)(h l).
Therefore, the report (1; G+ bs) is feasible for a Bk provider if Lemma 1 holds. Finally, the report (1; G+ bs)
is never feasible for a B1 provider because his average outcome is bs when M = 1.
I now show that partial pooling equilibria exist only if (1; G + bs) can be supported as an equilibrium
report. First, the value of the left-hand side of (6) is zero at and only at (1; G + bs). Second, according to
(4), the slope of a Bk providers iso-dumping-cost curve is dAdM =
lB(h A)+hB(A l)
M(lB hB)
. And according to (1),
the slope of the lower bound of a G1 provider feasibility (M;A) set (the upper-sloping solid curve starting
from point a in Figure 2) is   dA
dDhG1
= dAdM =
(1 )(h l)
M2 . Upon simplication, the iso-dumping-cost curve is
steeper because 0  !(vl   vh) and Lemma 1 imply 1 > lB hB
lB
G
h l . Hence, the value of the left-hand side
of (5) at (1; G+ bs) must also be the lowest among all reports that are feasible for a G1 provider.
Because (6) is always nonbinding at (1; G + bs), the existence of partial pooling equilibria depends only
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on (5). Substitute DhBk(1; G+ bs) and DlBk(1; G+ bs) into (5). The constraint is satised if p   <  , where
p in (8) is the value of  that holds (5) as an equality.
(b) Renement. I have shown that (1; G+ bs) minimizes the left-hand sides of both (5) and (6) among all
possible partial pooling reports. Therefore, in any undefeated partial pooling equilibrium, the consumers
beliefs upon observing (1; G+ bs) must be (1 )(1 )+(1 ) . The beliefs eliminate any equilibrium in which the
partial pooling report is not (1; G+ bs).
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) Existence. In a separating equilibrium, a G1 providers report (MG1; AG1)
must satisfy (10) and be feasible for a G1 provider to obtain. The report must also satisfy (9) or be infeasible
for a Bk provider. Finally, the same report must be infeasible or unprotable for a B1 provider to obtain.
Incentive constraints (9) and (10) restrict, respectively, the minimum and maximum proportions of
consumers that a G1 provider can dump. The strictly-positive slopes of these curves in the report space
(M;A) are given by (4). Because 0  !(vl   vh), (9) is never steeper than (10). Therefore, separating
equilibria exist only if the report that is feasible for a G1 provider, and satises (9) with the biggest mass
and highest average, can be supported as (MG1; AG1). Because of the quality premium G, the report
(MG1; AG1) is always infeasible for a B1 provider to obtain. I now characterize this report at every  ,  <  .
There are two cases.
Case 1. Condition (9) is satised at (1; G+ bs). Because (1; G+ bs) is feasible for a G1 provider and (9) is
not binding here, the report can be supported as (MG1; AG1). Substitute DhBk(1; G+ bs) and DlBk(1; G+ bs)
into (9). The constraint is satised if   s, where s in (11) is the value of  that holds (9) as an equality.
Case 2. Condition (9) is not satised at (1; G+bs) or s <  . Here a G1 provider must dump consumers to
satisfy (9) as an equality. Inequality (7) guarantees that a Bk provider would never dump all his l consumers
and henceMG1 > k and AG1 < h . Therefore, a G1 provider must dump less than (1 ) of his l consumers
to obtain the report (MG1; AG1), which satises (9) with the biggest mass and highest average. By condition
(1), DlG1(MG1; AG1) has to satisfy
1 DlG1 = k  DhBk  DlBk and G+
h+ (1  )l  DlG1l
1 DlG1
=
k(h+ (1  )l) DhBkh DlBkl
k  DhBk  DlBk
:
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The binding incentive constraint (9) requires DhBk
h
B +D
l
Bk
l
B = GbqbB . The three equalities solve for
DlG1 =
h
Gbq bB
lB
  (k   1)  lB hB
lB

(k   1)  Gh l
i.h
1  lB hB
lB
G
h l
i
: (A1)
Finally, constraint (10) is not binding at DlG1 given by (A1) because Gbq bGlG  DlG1 =
Gbq h bG
lG
  bB
lB
i
+
lB hB
lB
h
(k   1)  Gh l
i
+
1

h
(k   1) 
h
Gbq bG
lG
i h
lB hB
lB
i


G
h l
i
> 0; (A2)
where sT  !(T + vs) + (1   !)P and bT  hT + (1   )lT . In (A2), the rst squared-bracket term
is nonnegative because 0 < G and 0  !(vl   vh). The second squared-bracket term is nonnegative if (3)
holds. The expression 
l
B hB
lB
in front of the second and in the third squared-bracket terms is nonnegative
and smaller than one because 0  !(vl   vh). Moreover, Gbq bG
lG
< (1  ) according to (7). Therefore, the
value of the third squared-bracket term is bigger than (k   1)   Gh l , which is nonnegative according to
Lemma 1.
(b) Renement. A Bk provider incurs no dumping cost in all separating equilibria, and hence, the
equilibrium in which a G1 provider obtains the highest payo¤must defeat other separating equilibria. When
(1; G + bs) satises (9), it is obviously the report that gives the highest payo¤ to a G1 provider. When
(1; G + bs) fails to satisfy (9), (MG1; AG1) in part (a) is selected to satisfy the constraint with the biggest
M . By construction, When 0 < !(vl   vh), a G1 providers iso-dumping-cost curves are steeper than (9)
everywhere. Therefore, (MG1; AG1) in part (a) gives a G1 provider the highest equilibrium payo¤ at every  .
When 0 = !(vl  vh), a G1 provider is indi¤erent among all reports that satisfy (9) as an equality. However,
the tie-breaking rule in Section 2 selects (MG1; AG1) in part (a) as the equilibrium report at every  .
Proof of Proposition 3: Let s <  <  and that both classes of equilibria exist. By Propositions
1 and 2, the di¤erence between a G1 providers payo¤s in the least-cost separating equilibrium and partial
pooling equilibrium is
 DlG1(MG1; AG1)lG + (1 )(1 )+(1 ) GbqbG (A3)
where DlG1(MG1; AG1) is given by (A1). Because D
l
G1 is independent of  and Gbq bGlG  DlG1 > 0, (A3) is
negative if and only if  <  , where
0 <   
h
Gbq bG
lG
 DlG1
i.

h
Gbq bG
lG
 DlG1
i
+ (1  )DlG1

< 1: (A4)
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Suppose 0 <  <  so that (A3) is positive. If the least-cost partial pooling equilibrium is not defeated
by the least-cost separating equilibrium, consumers must believe in the partial pooling equilibrium that a
provider with report (MG1; AG1) is a G1 provider with probability one. Therefore, a G1 provider can raise
his payo¤ by moving from the partial pooling report (Mp; Ap) to (MG1; AG1). This protable deviation is a
contradiction.
Now suppose  <  < 1 so that (A3) is negative. If the least-cost separating equilibrium is not defeated
by the least-cost partial pooling equilibrium, consumers must believe in the separating equilibrium that a
provider with report (Mp; Ap) is a G1 provider with probability
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) . Thus according to (5) and
(A3), both Bk and G1 providers payo¤s increase by moving from their respective separating reports to
(Mp; Ap). Again, a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1: First, di¤erentiate p in (8) with respect to ! and collect terms, I have
@p
@!
=

(vl   vh)P  h (1 )(1 )+(1 )GbqbBi < 0:
Because s =
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) 

p, the derivative implies
@s
@! < 0. Second, let 

s <  and di¤erentiate D
l
G1 in
(A1) with respect to !. Upon simplication, I have
@DlG1
@!
=   (vl   vh)P
h
(k   1)  Gh l

+ (k   1) Gh l + Gbq(  Gh l )i.hlB   (lB  hB) Gh li2 :
This derivative is always negative, and it is su¢ cient to check the rst squared-bracket term. According
to (3), (k   1)   Gh l is nonnegative. Suppose Gh l  . The squared-bracket term is positive because
0 < (k   1) Gh l . Suppose  < Gh l . By inequality (7) and (1   )lB < bB , I have Gbq < k. Hence,
(k   1) Gh l + Gbq(  Gh l ) > k  Gh l > (k   1)  Gh l and the squared-bracket term is positive.
Proof of Lemma 4: Because l   H < l   L, a Bk provider can raise his adjusted average more by
dumping l consumers with signal H. Suppose k   1  k(1   )". A Bk provider dumps only l consumers
with signal H to reach M = 1. By (12), the providers adjusted average is k(bs  b)  (k   1)(l  H), where
bs  h+ (1  )l and b  f(1  ")H + "Lg+ (1  )f(1  ")L+ "Hg. This is not lower than G+ bs  b if
G  (k   1)[(h  l) + f"+ (1  )(1  ")g(H   Lg]: (A5)
Next, suppose k(1   )" < k   1. Now a Bk provider has to dump all his l consumers with signal H and
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(k   1)   k(1   )" of his l consumers with signal L to reach M = 1. By (13), his adjusted average is
k(bs  b)  k(1  )"(l  H)  f(k   1)  k(1  )"g(l  H). This is not lower than G+ bs  b if
G  (k   1)[(h  l) + f(1  )"+ (k   1)(1  ")g(H   Lg]: (A6)
The value of the right-hand side of (A6) is smaller than that of (A5) if and only if k(1   )" < k   1.
Combining the two conditions leads to (13) in the lemma. In (13), " + (1   )(1   ") is always strictly
positive, and (1  )"+ (k   1)(1  ") is negative if and only if k(1  )" < k   1.
Proof of Proposition 4: I rst show that if (13) holds and no provider is willing to dump all of his l
consumers, condition (15) implies there is no report (M;AA) that is only feasible for a G1 provider. Because
of the quality premium G > 0, any report (M;AA) that is feasible for a G1 provider and has AA < G+bs b
must also be feasible for a Bk provider. Now consider the reports with AA > G+bs b. Specically, consider
the highest AA that both G1 and Bk providers can obtain at di¤erent M . Because (7) has ruled out the
corner solution where a provider dumps all his l consumers, it is su¢ cient to consider k < M  1. Using
(12) to calculate AABk  AAG1 at M , k < M  1, I have
1
M (k   1)[(h  l) + f"+ (1  )(1  ")g(H   L)] G if k(1  (1  )") < M  1;
1
M [(k   1)f(h  l)  (1  ")(H   L)g   f1  (1  )" Mg(H   L)] G if Maxf1  (1  )"; kg
< M  Minfk(1  (1  )"); 1g;
1
M [(k   1)f(h  l)  (1  ")(H   L)g   f1  (1  )" Mg(H   L)] G if k < M  1  (1  )":
In the rst case both G1 and Bk providers dump only l consumers with signal H. In the second case
a Bk provider dumps l consumers with both signals, whereas a G1 provider dumps only l consumers with
signal H. Finally, in the third case both G1 and Bk providers dump l consumers with both signals.
Note that AABk  AAG1 is positive in case one if (13) in Lemma 4 holds. Moreover, in both case one
and case three, AABk  AAG1 is always decreasing in M because H   L  h   l. Therefore, AABk 
AAG1 can possibly be nonpositive only in case two. Condition (15) says that AABk  AAG1 is positive at
M = 1   (1   )". This condition is su¢ cient to guarantee that AABk  AAG1 is positive in all cases, and
that no report (M;AA) is only feasible for a G1 provider.
Now suppose inequalities (13), (15) hold and ! = 0. Consider partial pooling equilibria. Following the
proof of Proposition 1, it is easy to see that equilibria exist only if (1; G + bs   b) can be supporting as
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(Mp; AAp). When ! = 0, hT = 
l
T =
bT and (1; G+ bs  b) satises the modied incentive constraint (5) if
k  1  (1 )(1 )+(1 ) Gbq. The last inequality leads to p that is identical to the one in (8) with ! = 0. For
renement, note that when hT = 
l
T =
bT , a providers dumping cost depends only on the total mass of
consumers he dumps. Because (1; G+bs  b) allows both G1 and Bk providers to dump the least consumers,
the equilibrium with that report defeats all other partial pooling equilibria.
Next, consider separating equilibria. Again, follow the proof of Proposition 2 and consider the equilibrium
reports at which a G1 provider dumps the least consumers. When ! = 0, the report (1; G+bs b) satises the
modied incentive constraint (5) if k  1  Gbq. Therefore, (1; G+bs  b) can be supported as (MG1; AAG1)
if   s  k 1Gbq , and this s is also the same as the one in (11) with ! = 0. If s <    , the modied
incentive constraint (9) must be satised as an equality. Here, the tie-breaking rule always selects the report
with the highest AA. Hence,
DlHG1(MG1; AAG1) +D
lL
G1(MG1; AAG1) = Gbq   (k   1): (A7)
The modied incentive constraint (10) is not binding at this (MG1; AAG1) because the constraint allows a
G1 provider to dump, at most, Gbq of his consumers. Moreover, the values of DlG1 in (A1) and DlHG1 +DlLG1
in (A7) are identical when ! = 0. Finally, at every  , the equilibrium report characterized above allows a
G1 provider to dump the lowest possible proportion of his consumers. Hence, this is the only equilibrium
report that satises the tie-breaking rule and is not defeated by any other separating equilibrium.
Because G1 and Bk providers are dumping the same proportions of consumers in each class of least-cost
equilibria under the two reporting regimes. Proposition 3 remains valid under adjusted average outcome
reporting.
Proof of Corollary 4: First, the actual average outcomes with and without dumping are
G+
h+ f(1  ) DlH  DlLgl
1 DlH  DlL > G+ h+ (1  )l;
where G is the market average quality premium. The inequality holds as long as 0 < DlH +DlL.
Now consider the expected average outcomes. The expected outcome with dumping is lower than the
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one without dumping if
f"L+ (1  ")Hg+ (1  )f"H + (1  ")Lg  DlHH  DlLL
1 DlH  DlL > f"L+(1 ")Hg+(1 )f"H+(1 ")Lg;
which yields (16) upon simplication.
Proof of Corollary 5: When the agency only reports A, a Bq provider, q = 1; k, can obtain report
A = G+ bs by setting G+ bs = qbs DlBq(G+bs)l
q DlBq(G+bs) or DlBq(G+ bs) = GqG+(h l) . The report A = G+ bs is feasible for
a Bk provider if GqG+(h l)  q(1   ). This inequality can be simplied to (17) in the corollary. Moreover,
(3) implies (17) because k   1 < k(1  ) implies k < 1, or (k   1) < (1  ).
Now suppose the agency only reports AA. There are two cases to consider. Case 1. A Bq provider can
obtain report AA = G+ bs  b by dumping only l consumers with signal H. In this case DlBq(G+ bs  b) is
given by G+ bs  b = q(bs b) DlBq(G+bs b)(l H)
q DlBq(G+bs b) or DlBq(G+ bs  b) = GqG+(h l)+(H b) . The last expression is
always smaller than DlBq(G+ bs) = GqG+(h l) because b < H.
Case 2. A Bq provider can obtain report AA = G+bs b only if he dumps l consumers with both signals.
In this case DlBq(G+ bs  b) is given by
G+ bs  b = 1
k DlBq(G+bs b) [q(bs  b)  fDlBq(G+ bs  b)  q(1  )"g(l   L)  k(1  )"(l  H)] or
DlBq(G+ bs  b) = q[G  (1  )"(H   L)]/ [G+ (h  l)  f"+ (1  )(1  ")g(H   L)]:
Upon simplication, DlBq(G+ bs  b) < DlBq(G+ bs) = GqG+(h l) if GG+(1 )(h l) < ".
Proof of Corollary 6: First, according to (1), only a Gk provider can obtain M  k, A  G+ bs and
be designated as Above Average. Second, again according to (1), a B1 provider will be designated as Below
Average, irrespective of his dumping decisions. Finally, according to the same condition, both G1 and Bk
providers can obtain M  1 and A Minfh; bs (1 M)lM g and be designated as Below Average by dumping
some consumers, but each of them can be designated as Average by serving all consumers.
I now show that in the unique undefeated equilibrium, each Tq provider serves all his consumers in period
one. First, serving all consumers in period one is the optimal strategy of each Tq provider if consumers in
period two believe that an Above Average provider is a Gk provider with probability one, an Average provider
is a G1 provider with probability (1 )(1 )+(1 ) and a Bk provider with probability
(1 )
(1 )+(1 ) , and that
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a Below Average provider is a B1 provider with probability one. Therefore, this is indeed an equilibrium.
Second, given the construction of the alternative reporting scheme, the equilibrium simultaneously allows
each Tq provider to have the highest possible designation and demand in period two, and to dump no
consumer in period one. Therefore, the equilibrium must defeat all other equilibria.
Consider welfare next. I rst use the expressions for welfare in Footnotes 30 and 31 to get
WPR() WNR() = 2(1  )G2bq
WPR() Wp() = 2(1  )G2bq (1 )(1 )+(1 ) + 2(1  )[DhBkUhB +DlBkU lB ]
WPR() Ws() = 2(1  )DlG1U lG
WPR() WAR() = 2(1  )G2bq (1 )(1 )+(1 ) :
From these expressions, it is easy to see that WNR() < WAR() < WPR() at every , and that Wp() <
WAR() whenever partial pooling equilibria exist. Now compare WAR() with Ws(), the former is higher
if
G2bq (1 )(1 )+(1 )  DlG1U lG < 0:
This inequality must hold when  is su¢ ciently close to one.
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Supplement
This supplementary section contains two parts. The rst part allows prices in the basic model in Section 4
to vary with providersperceived service qualities. The second part uses the intuitive criterion to rene the
least-cost partial pooling equilibrium in Proposition 1.
Quality and price
Section 4 studies the equilibria with a xed service price P . A providers incentive trade-o¤ is about the
masses of consumers he can serve in periods one and two. I now allow service prices to vary with consumers
perceptions about a providers quality type. Hence, a providers performance report can a¤ect both his
expected demand and prot margin in period two. To focus on the informational role of performance
reports, I will maintain that the prices are exogenous, thereby eliminating the possibility that a provider
may use price as a signalling device.
To facilitate comparison, I let the price of a Ti providers service be P + ( eTi   G), 0 <  < 1.
The consumers in period one have no information about a providers quality type. They must infer that a
providers expected quality premium eTi is the prior G. Hence, the service price in period one is always
equal to P . However, the performance reports allow the consumers in period two to update their posterior
beliefs eTi. A providers service price in period two is increasing in this perception. I will continue to use sT
to denote !(Ti + vs) + (1   !)P . Therefore, if a Ti provider serves an s consumer, the providers payo¤ is
sT in period one, and 
s
T + (1  !)( eTi   G) in period two.
I also incorporate price di¤erences into the demand responses. Suppose consumers in period two believe
that the quality types of Providers i and j, j 6= i, are respectively eTi and eTj . The expected mass of
consumers who switch between providers is now  [f eTi  P   ( eTi   G)g   f eTj  P   ( eTj   G)g]bq =
 [(1 )( eTi   eTj)]bq. Because  is strictly less than one, a providers expected demand is still increasing in
consumersperception about his quality type.
How would the price response change the equilibria? The service prices do not a¤ect a providers feasibility
of gaming his performance report, hence the analysis in Section 3 follows. Now consider the incentive
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Figure 7: Price responses and incentive constraints
constraints (5), (6), (9), and (10) in Section 4. The left-hand sides of these inequalities remain unchanged,
but the right-hand sides have to be expanded from  eT bqbT to
[ eT bqbT ] + hf1 + (1 )( eT   G)gbq(1  !) eTi  [ eT bqfbT + (1  !)(1 )Gg]; (S1)
where eT = (1 )(1 )+(1 )G in a partial pooling equilibrium and eT = G in a separating equilibrium.
The second and third squared-bracket terms in (S1) are the e¤ects of price response on the providers
inter-period incentive trade-o¤s. In the second term, f1 + (1   )( eT   G)gbq is a providers expected
demand when his perceived quality is eT , and (1 !) eT is the increase in prot margin when the providers
perceived quality increases from B = 0 to eT . The price response also reduces the demand response when the
perceived qualities of Providers x and y are di¤erent. This e¤ect is captured by the third squared-bracket
term in (S1). The incentive constraints in Section 4 shift parallel to the right if the sum of the two terms is
positive, and vice versa. Because sT = !(Ti + v
s) + (1   !)P , the values of both terms depend on !, the
weight providers put on the consumersnet payo¤s.
Proposition 5 Suppose Provider is service price is P + (eTi   G), 0 <  < 1. The price response
( eTi   G) lowers p and s, and leads to more dumping in the least-cost separating equilibrium at every
 , s <  <  , if
0  ! < ! 
h
1
 + (1 )( (1 )(1 )+(1 )   2)G
i
  Ph
1
 + (1 )( (1 )(1 )+(1 )   2)G
i
+ bs  P : (S2)
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A providers weights of extrinsic and intrinsic payo¤s a¤ect his valuations between prot margin and
volume in period two, hence his incentive to dump consumers in period one. By Propositions 1 and 2,
the properties of the least-cost equilibria are shaped by the incentive constraints of a Bk provider. When
0  ! < !, a Bk provider puts a su¢ ciently small weight on his consumers payo¤s, and the sum of
the second and third squared-bracket terms in (S1) is positive at every  . Figure 7 illustrates how the
price response alters the least-cost equilibria in this case. In the diagram, the price response shifts the Bk
providers two incentive constraints to the right. This allows point a to be supported as a partial pooling
equilibrium report, and moves the separating equilibrium report from point g to point j.50 Because 1 < G,
the (identical) squared-bracket terms in (S2) are strictly positive. However, 0 < ! only if P is smaller than
its preceding squared-bracket term.51
The case where 0  ! < ! is nevertheless interesting because here the price response lowers consumer
welfare unambiguously. First, Figure 7 has demonstrated that providers dump (weakly) more consumers in
period one. In period two, because the expected value of eT  G is zero, the price response does not change
the expected price. However, the price variations reduce the demand response. This lowers consumer welfare
gain from quality information dissemination by the magnitude of (1 )2.52
Proof of Proposition 5: In (8) and (11), the denominators are eT bqbT , where eT = (1 )(1 )+(1 )G andeT = G, respectively. Therefore, the price response must lower the values of p and s if the value of (S1) is
larger than  eT bqbT at every  . Upon simplication, the value of (S1) is larger than  eT bqbT at a given  if
! <
1
 + (1 )( eT   2G)  P
1
 + (1 )( eT   2G) + bs  P :
Because the right-hand side of the inequality is decreasing in  and (1 )(1 )+(1 ) < 1, the value of (S1) is
larger than  eT bqbT at every  if condition (S2) holds.
Now let s   <  and consider the least-cost separating equilibria. Recall DlG1(MG1; AG1) in (A1) is
50Provided that  is su¢ ciently small. See the proof of Proposition 5 for the necessary condition for the existence
of separating equilibria.
51Note that (S2) is a su¢ cient condition. When ! < !, the two constraints shift in di¤erent directions when ! is
small, and both shift to the right only when ! is su¢ ciently close to one.
52The welfare gains from quality information dissemination in separating and partial pooling are 2(1   )(1  
)2G2bq and 2(1  )(1 )2G2bq (1 )2+(1 )2
(1 )+(1 ) , respectively.
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derived from the binding incentive constraint of a Bk provider. Because of the price response, GbqbB in
the expression has to be replaced by
[GbqbB ] + [f1 + (1 )(G  G)gbq(1  !)G]  [GbqfbB + (1  !)(1 )Gg];
which has a larger value than GbqbB if condition (S2) holds. Finally, upon simplication, the G1 providers
incentive constraint (10) is not binding at the new DlG1 only if the left-hand side of (A2) is bigger than
Gbq h bG
lG
  bB
lB
i
+ bq(1  !)G(1 + (1 )(1  2)G)" (lG lB)+(lB hB) Gh l
lG
l
B
#
:
Intuitive criterion renement
The following proposition applies the intuitive criterion to the least-cost partial pooling equilibrium under
average outcome reporting.
Proposition 6 The least-cost partial pooling equilibrium in Proposition 1 cannot be eliminated by the intu-
itive criterion if h  l  bG! .
In this equilibrium, consumers in period two infer that a provider with report (1; G + bs) is a good type
with probability (1 )(1 )+(1 ) . Consider a unilateral deviation with the most favorable consumersbeliefs
that a provider with a di¤erent report (fM; eA) is a good type with probability one. A deviating provider
expects to gain (1 )(1 )+(1 ) Gbq consumers in period two. Because a G1 provider dumps no consumer in
the least-cost equilibrium, it is su¢ cient to consider fM < 1. The equilibrium is eliminated by the intuitive
criterion if there is at least one pair of (fM; eA) that is infeasible for a B1 provider to obtain and
[DhBk(fM; eA) DhBk(1; G+ bs)]hB + [DlBk(fM; eA) DlBk(1; G+ bs)]lB > (1 )(1 )+(1 ) GbqbB ; (S3)
[DhG1(fM; eA) DhG1(1; G+ bs)]hG + [DlG1(fM; eA) DlG1(1; G+ bs)]lG < (1 )(1 )+(1 ) GbqbG: (S4)
On the left-hand sides of (S3) and (S4) are the costs of deviating from (Mp; Ap) to (fM; eA) for Bk and
G1 providers in period one, respectively. On the right-hand sides are the gains from increasing period-two
expected demands associated with deviating to (fM; eA). If both conditions are satised, only a G1 provider
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Figure 8: Renement of partial pooling equilibrium reports
will nd it protable to unilaterally deviate from (Mp; Ap) to (fM; eA). Thus, the period-two consumers
beliefs that a provider with the report (fM; eA) is a good type are justied.
The su¢ cient condition in Proposition 6, h  l  bG! , guarantees that the least-cost equilibrium survives
the intuitive criterion.53 The inequality requires the di¤erence between h and l consumersoutcomes, h  l,
to be relatively small. Figure 8 demonstrates the intuition. First consider point a. This is the least-cost
equilibrium report where Ap = G+ bs. Starting from this point, the upper and lower solid curves bound the
combinations of (M;A) that are feasible for a G1 (and a Bk) provider. The two solid curves on the left
depict (S3) and (S4). Point k, which lies between the two curves, illustrates a deviation that is protable to
a G1 provider only. This report eliminates the equilibrium at point a.
Now suppose the value of h is decreased to h   , where l < h   . The least-cost equilibrium report
is now at point l, where Ap = G + bs   . Starting from this point, the combinations of feasible (M;A)
have shrunk. In addition, according to (4), both (S3) and (S4) rotate clockwise, and become the two dashed
curves. Because of the quality premium G, condition (S4) has to rotate proportionately more, and now there
is no deviation that is only protable to a G1 provider. Hence, a G1 provider fails to separate from a Bk
provider when h  l is small.
53Depending on the slopes of the iso-dumping cost curves, the intuitive criterion can fail to eliminate some (when
lB  hB > 0), or all partial pooling equilibria (when lB  hB = 0).
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Proof of Proposition 6: A G1 provider can separate from a Bk provider by choosing a report that (i)
is feasible for both G1 and Bk providers (and infeasible for a B1 provider), and satises (S3), (S4); or (ii) is
infeasible for a Bk provider (which must also be infeasible for a B1 provider according to (1)). Consider the
rst case. Using (2), the expressions DsTq(fM; eA) DsTq(1; G+ bs), s = h; l , in (S3), (S4) can be rewritten as
[DhTq(
fM; eA) DhTq(1; G+ bs)] = (T + h G+ bs)  (T + h  eA)fMh  l ;
[DlTq(fM; eA) DlTq(1; G+ bs)] = (G+ bs  T   l)  ( eA  T   l)fMh  l :
Substitute these expressions into (S3), (S4) and rearrange the terms, the two inequalities become
[(h G+ bs)  (h  eA)fM ]hBbB + [(G+ bs  l)  ( eA  l)fM ]lBbB > h (1 )(1 )+(1 ) i Gbq(h  l); (S5)
[(h+ bs)  (G+ h  eA)fM ]hGbG + [(bs  l)  ( eA G  l)fM ]lGbG < h (1 )(1 )+(1 ) i Gbq(h  l): (S6)
The intuitive criterion can eliminate the least-cost equilibrium only if there exists a pair of (fM; eA) such that
the value of the left-hand side of (S5) is bigger than that of (S6), or
(vl   vh) !GbGbB
h
 f(hB   !h) + (1  )(lB   !l)g(1  fM)  !(G+ bs  eAfM)i > 0; (S7)
where I use the identities sT  !(T + vs) + (1  !)P and bT  hT + (1  )lT to simplify the terms.
Suppose !(vl   vh) = 0. The left-hand side of (S7) becomes zero for any (fM; eA). Hence the intuitive
criterion fails to eliminate the least-cost equilibrium. Now let !(vl   vh) > 0. By condition (1), 1   fM =
DhG1(
fM; eA) +DlG1(fM; eA) and G+ bs  eAfM = DhG1(fM; eA)(G+ h) +DlG1(fM; eA)(G+ l). Therefore, (S7) can
be rewritten as
(vl   vh) !GbGbB
h
fDlG1(fM; eA) DhG1(fM; eA)(1  )g!(h  l)  fDhG1(fM; eA) +DlG1(fM; eA)gbGi > 0:
This inequality fails to hold for any positive DhG1(fM; eA) and DlG1(fM; eA) if !(h  l) < bG.
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